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INTRODUCTION 
The provision of adequate facilities for lending to farmers 
has always been of paramount importance to the economic well-
being of New Zealand. On the introduction of the Wool and Oil 
Securities Bill, 1858, the first New Zealand legislation designed 
specifically to facilitate farm borrowing, the House was told: 
This measure was of a very simple and intelligible character, 
and one much needed in this country, where great inconvenience 
was frequently experienced from the want of ready cash. The 
difficulty of obtaining ready money frequently resulted in 
injury to stock, and materially retarded the producing powers 
of the country. ( 1) 
Over a century later in the 1971 Budget the Minister of 
Finance stated: 
"Farming will remain New Zealand's largest and most 
important export earner for as far ahead as we can see, 
and the Government is committed to maintain the 
viability of farming in the national interest." 
In 1970 agricultural produce and processed agricultural 
products provided 86 per cent of the total value of exports from 
New Zealand. The National Development Conference recommended that 
55 per cent of the a:ldi tional exports required to meet national 
needs in 1979 should come from the agricultural sector (2). 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the law relating to 
securities over livestock in New Zealand (3) and to determine 
(1) Mr. Stafford . New Zealand Parliamentary Debates Vol. 2 
(1858) p.382 here referred to as Hansard plus the appropriate 
volume, year and page reference. 
(2) Lending to Farmers. Report of the Commission of Inquiry, 
January 1972 p.13: here referred to as Lending to Farmers. 
(3) For a general introduction to the historical and policy 
background of the New Zealand legislation in this field, 
see Riesenfeld, Quagmire of Chattels Securities in New 
Zealand, Legal Research Foundation, Auckland. 
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whether it is suitable for its purpose. Where weaknesses exist 
in the present legislation these have been discussed and improvements 
suggested. Although the traditional English approach does not 
permit reference to the Parliamentary Debates as an aid to 
statutory interpretation (4) for the purposes of gaining a deeper 
understanding of the special problems in this area such references 
have been included in the present paper. The practical background 
to this type of lending has also been described to explain why 
legislation which contains more than its share of problems and 
uncertainties should have remained so long on the statute books 
without modification. For this aspect of the paper the writer has 
relied to a certain extent on views expressed by solicitors dealing 
with this type of security, stock and station agents, bankers and 
farmers. Various relevant passages in letters received from country 
solicitors on the question as to whether the present law is 
satisfactory have been reproduced in full rather than paraphrased 
by the writer to enable the reader to appreciate more clearly the 
opinion of those so closely involved in the practical aspects of 
this type of security. A further section dealing with some of the 
parallel United States laws in this field has been included, as a 
means of comparison and,where appropriate ,as a model for improvement 
in our own law. However in many cases it will be seen that the 
(4) The strict application of this principle was well illustrated 
in the interpretation of s.28(2) (d) of the Finance Act 1960 
(U.K.) in Cleary v. I.R.C. [1967] 2 All E.R. 48 (H.L.) 
Viscount Dilhorne refused in his interpretation of that 
section to be influenced by what had been said in Parliament 
about that section cy the man who had taken responsibility for 
drafting it. In fact the judge and the draftsman (then Sir 
Reginald Manningham-Bu11er ) were the same person: see F esch 
Tax Avoidance (1968) Current Legal Problems 215 at 219. 
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American attempts to deal with the special problems raised in 
livestock securities have been no more successful than our own. 
The paper is divided into four parts. 
Part I deals with the law relating to livestock securities in 
New Zealand as contained in the Chattels Transfer Act 1924 
and discusses the following areas: 
(a) the definition of livestock 
(b) classes of livestock 
(c) description of livestock 
(d) after-acquired stock 
(e) description of land 
(f) sale of encumbered stock 
(g) purchasers and auctioneers of encumbered stock 
(h) wool securities 
(i) variation of priority of instrurrents 
Part II examines the pr-actical background to the lending on the 
security of livestock in New Zealand and explains the 
inter-relation between the law and practice in this field. 
Part III by way of comparison looks at certain aspects of the 
American laws relating to livestock securities and deals 
with the following areas: 
(a) Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(b) farm products - Section 9-109 
(c) description of livestock 
(d) after-acquired stock 
(e) sale of encumbered stock 
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Part IV concludes the paper by summarising the recommendations 
made during the previous sections as to improvements in 
the present Jaw. 
-S-
PART I: LIVESTOCK SECURITIES UNDER THE CHATTELS TRANSFER ACT 192 4 
(a) The definition of Stock 
"Stock" is defined in the present Act as including any sheep, 
cattle, horses, pigs, poultry, ostriches, and any other living 
animals (5). It is interesting to note the objection made by 
the member for Gisborne when the extended definition of "stock" 
was introduced in the 1924 Chattels Transfer Bill. Mr. Lynsar 
cited this definition as a matter which should be adjusted "if 
the producer is to have any existence at all without being 
absolutely controlled in every movement by the mercantile 
institutions of the Dominion" (6). The then Minister for Justice 
the Hon. Mr. Parr considered there was nothing sinister in the 
definition of stock: 
"It [the definition] is certainly comprehensive ; but 
a definition cannot hurt anybody, so that nothing 
attaches to the objection that the definition is 
too wide. Until a person puts his hand to paper and 
mortgages or deals with a particular animal, the 
definition cannot affect him." (7) 
(5) S.2 Chattels Transfer Act 1924; cf. Mortgages of Stock 
Registration Act 186 8. S. 5 "stock" shall include any sheep 
cattle or horses; Chattels Securities Act 1880, 111 stock' 
includes any sheep, cattle and horses; Chattels Transfer 
Act 1889 and 1908; "stock " includes any sheep, cattle, 
horses, pigs, poultry, ostriches and llamas." 
(6) Hansard Vol. 205 (1924) p.632 
Mr. Lynsar (Gisborne) ... "I will ask honourable gentlemen 
to look a.t the interpretation of the word "stock". It includes 
any sheep, cattle, horses, pigs, poultry, ostriches, and other 
living animals. "Any living animals" will include a man's 
cat, dog, or goat. An Hon. Member - And rabbits. 
Mr. Lynsar - Yes, and rabbits; but unfortunately the 
mercantile institutions cannot catch them. 
(7) Hansard (1924) Vol. 205 p.638. 
Yictoria University of 
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It is considered that the present definition of "stock" is 
practical and realistic, since by reason of its all-embracing 
nature it removes any scope for dispute as to whether any given 
animal falls within its scope (8). 
The earlier cases in which it was attempted to restrict the 
meaning of the expression "stock" to embrace only "stock" 
depasturing on a farm or station were dispelled In re Alloway (9) 
by Edwards J. who held that horses, whatever the occupation of their 
owner were "stock" within the meaning of the Chattels Transfer Act 
190 8. 
" ... a horse is in my opinion a horse, a cow is a 
cow, and a sheep is a sheep, no matter what the 
occupation of its owner may be, and whether he has 
an occupation or not." (10) 
(b) Classes of Stock 
A more difficult question of interpretation in s.29 is the 
meaning to be ascribed to the word "class" in the phrase "all 
stock of the class or classes described in the instrument" . 
Does the word refer to the particular genus of living animals 
such cS "sheep" or "pigs" or may it refer to a class or category 
within a genus e.g. "J.ersey" or "Friesian" cows, "dairy" or "beef" 
(8) Quaere: a chattel mortgage of fish! 
(9) [1916) N.Z.L.R. 433. In so holding Edwards J. dissented 
from two earlier decisions; Andrews v. Fan Tu (1909) 
28 N.Z.L.R. 1042 a bill of sale by an expressman over his 
vehicle and horse was held, as regards the horse, a mortgage 
of stock under the Act: Hickrnott v. Kesteven (1913) 15 
G.L.R. 402 a carrier's horse held not to be "stock" within 
the Act. 
(10) ibid. p.445. 
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cattle? If the latter interpretation is correct, a grantee could 
find his security defeated where, for example, a farmer replaced all 
his sheep of one breed by those of another. This would be an 
unfavourable result since it would facilitate the impairment of 
the grantee's security. 
Ball (11) says that although there is no direct authority, 
it appears that sheep, cattle, horses, pigs, poultry, and any 
other genus of living animal each constitute a class. However, 
he does acknowledge a passage from Chapman J. 's judgment in the 
Supreme Court in Bailey's case supporting a different interpretation 
of the word "class" : 
"here it is unnecessary as a matter of business to draw 
any distinction between one class of cows and another ... " (12) 
On the other hand Edwards J. in the Court of Appeal considered that 
if any instrument under the Act: 
" ..• assigns or purports to assign animals referred to in 
the operative part of the instrument as the "stock" 
described in the schedule thereto, and such stock are 
found by reference to the schedule to consist of only 
one or more of the classes of animals which are intended 
by the interpretation clause of the statute in the word 
"stock " , the meaning· of that word, wherever used in the 
same instrument, is confined to stock of the species 
mentioned in the schedule." ( 13) 
Ball's view of the word "class" in s. 29 appears to bear the 
intention of the legislature as evidenced by the Parliarrentary 
(11) The Law Relating to Chattels Trans fer, Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1940, p.67. 
(12) Bailey [1916] N.Z.L.R. 9 at 18 (S.C.) cited in full at 
p.16 of this paper. 
(13) Bailey [1916] N.Z.L.R. 873 at 888 (C.A.). 
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debates preceding the enactment of this section (14). Originally 
the Government had endeavoured to enact an amended s. 29 which would 
have had the result that whenever a farmer mortgaged his sheep 
then all his other stock was also included and became subject to 
the security. The then Attorney-General the Hon. Sir Francis Bell 
introduced the Bi 11 stating it was a "highly technical piece of 
legislation" and he did not think any advantage would be gained by 
explaining or dis cussing it. The Attorney-General believed that 
the Bill which had been prepared by a committee of merchants and 
bankers and two very experienced lawyers appointed by them to help, 
"will be found to be a very beneficial measure indeed" (15). 
A cynic might be inclined to ask "very beneficial to whom?", 
because strong opposition was taken to a number of clauses 
especially clause 29. The member for Hamilton, Mr. Young, "felt 
sure that country settlers could not realise what was in this clause 
(i.e. clause 29), or they would be up in arms against it from one 
end of New Zealand to the other" (16). As a result of the 
controversy raised by this provision the Minister of Justice (17) 
"in deference to the views of a great many members of the House" 
agreed to strike ·out the new words in that clause so that a bill 
of sale would not include stock other than that specified in the bill. 
Even after so much heated discussion on clause 29 the 
(14) Refer to footnote ( 6) page 5 supra. 
(15) Hansard Vol. 204 (1924) p.923. 
(16) Hansard Vol. 205 (1924) p.280. 
(17) The Hon. Mr. Parr Hansard Vol. 205 (1924) p.633. 
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alteration initially accepted by its opponents (as shown by the 
deletion of the words underlined below) failed to alter the clause's 
effect: 
" ..• and all stock of every kind (whether of the classes 
described in the instrument or not) ... 
The situation was finally remedied when it was agreed to omit all 
the words struck out by the House (shown underlined above) but 
to substitute in lieu of the words so struck out, the words~ 
'of the class or clases described in the instrument' (18). 
From the foregoing discussion of the Parliamentary Debates 
it appears that the legislature intended the word "class" in s .29 
to refer to the species of stock and not the particular type or 
breed within a species. However this very important question is 
not free from doubt (19) and should be clarified at the first 
suitable occasion. It does seem an anomalous result when a 
security embracing ordinary breeding ewes worth say $6 .00 a head 
could give the grantee the right to after-acquired stud sheep worth 
$ 40 . 0 0 a he ad. Likewise the section would appear to create a 
blatant legal fiction if for example an after-acquired dairy herd 
is to be deemed to form part of the security on a herd of beef 
cattle. On the other hand once one enters into the area of drawing 
distinctions between types of sheep or cattle on the basis of breed 
or function the possibility of complex borderline cases based on 
(18) Hansard, Vol. 205 (1924), 1073 (Legislative Council); 
1078 (House of Representatives). 
(19) See Baile~ (S. c.) p .18 Chapman J. "one class of cows and 
the other . 
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fine distinctions may be endless. A significant merit of the 
present rugged approach which lumps all animals of a species into 
the one "class" is that lenders are more inclined to advance money 
to farmers knowing that even if there are changes of quality or 
type within the secured class of animals the loan is still 
protected (20). Nevertheless this is no excuse for not making 
it clear just what is meant by the word "class". 
( c) Description of Stock : s.28 
The Chattels Transfer Act requires that except in the case 
of the chattels :nentioned in s .26, every instrument shall contain 
a schedule of the chattels included therein: s.23. Whether or 
not a description is sufficient depends upon the circumstances 
of each case (21). However, the object of legislation which 
insists upon a description of chattels is to facilitate 
identification of articles enumerated in the schedule with those 
that are to be found in the possession of the granter. 
Identification should be mndered as easy as possible so that the 
dispute as to the mtention of the parties or the possibility of 
fraud and controversy to which general descriptions invariably give 
(20) Provided of course that there is an implied or express 
covenant to br"and or earmark. See also the covenant implied 
by clause 9 of the Fourth Schedule that forbids the granter 
without the grantee's consent in writing to change the 
general quality, character or description of the stock 
subject to the security. 
(21) Eyre v. McCullough [1925] N.Z.L.R. 395, 398. Herdman J. 
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rise should be rendered as rare as possible (22) . 
"The Statute (23) exists so that money advanced may be 
well secured, and so that the person who has the 
security 9=ts no more -than his security. It is a 
protection against dishonesty; and, while it safeguards 
creditors, it aims at enabling the rights of a grantee 
to be determined with certainty and without difficulty." (24). 
Livestock raise special problems of description. In a large flock 
of sheep or cattle of the same breed it is often impossible without 
human intervention by distinctively marking an animal, to 
distinguish the property of one owner from another. In addition 
to the difficulty of similar appearance is the natural increase 
which takes place each year in a breeding flock or herd. At the 
other end of the scale is the decrease in value of the security 
as stock grows older, becomes less productive and unless disposed 
of dies on the owner's lands. 
It is therefore not surprising that the Chattels Transfer Act 
has made special provision for the description requirements of 
livestock. Section 26 exempts, inter alia, stock, wool and 
crops from the operation of sections 23, 24 and 25 of the Act. 
In the case of livestock a special code is provided for their 
description in Sections 28, 29 and 30. No doubt the reason for 
the specially favourable treatment of mortgagees of stock, crops 
and wool was to enable farmers to borrow more readily from 
(22) Carpenter v. Deen 23 Q.B.D. 566, 574 per Fry L.J. adopted 
by Herdman J.~Eyre v. McCullough (supra) pp.397-8. 
(23) i.e. Chattels Transfer Act 1924. 
(24) Eyre v. McCullough (supra) at 398 per Herdman J. 
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financial institutions on the security of such chattels (25). 
Section 28 (26) requires stock to be described either 
(a) by brand, earmark or mark on them, or 
(b) by sex, age, name, colour or other mode of description 
so as to be reasonably capable of identification, and 
(c) the land or premises on which such stock are or are 
intended to be kept (27). 
If the requirements of ( a) or (b) above are not observed then the 
instrument is void as against the persons mentioned in s.18. Section 
28 does not state the consequences of a failure to describe the land 
or premises. However it has been held that the effect of non-
compliance with this requirement is that if the instrument is 
registered, the grantee is deprived of the benefit of such registration 
although the instrument is not invalidated as between the parties (28). 
"Branding", in the commonly accepted use of the term, means 
th.e . burning of a mark on the hi de, skin, face or horn of an animal 
(25) This opinion was expressed by Cooper J. in Official Assignee 
of Bailey v. Union Bank of Australia [1916] N.Z.L.R. 873 
atp.890 (C.A.). 
(26) The following letters (a), (b) and (c) and explanation are 
the writer's breakdown of the section's description 
requirements, and not the section as it appears in the Act. 
(27) The question of the description of land is discussed later 
in this paper at pp. 35-40. 
(28) Lee v. Official Assignee (1903) 22 N.Z.L.R. 747: cf the 
English Bills of Sale Act 1882 in which the consequence of 
non-registration was to avoid the instrument even between 
grantor and grantee. Lee's case was applied in Silk v. 
Dalgety & Co. Ltd. [1923] N.Z.L.R. 1065. The consequences 
of a failure to describe land is dealt with later in this 
paper at pp.37-38. 
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with a hot iron. This system of identification is understood to be 
very little practised these days in New Zealand (29). Although 
never judicially considered it is arguable that the statutory 
definition (30) of branding given in the various stock Acts and 
now embodied in the Animals Act 1967 would be used should the 
interpretation of this word ever be disputed. Generally in the 
earlier Acts the term included (in the case of sheep) earmarks, 
wool-marks, metal-clips attached to the ear, tattoo-marks and 
fire-marks on the horn or face. Therefore there are certainly 
grounds for arguing that for the purposes of s.28 of the Chattels 
Trans fer Act "branding" can be read as including "earmarking". 
"Marking" ,in the case of sheep has no,.;r lost favour , to a large 
extent and even its legality as a method of identifying sheep 
for the purposes of determining ownership. Due to the fact that 
any mark applied to the wool will be lost once the sheep is shorn, 
this method of description has never been ideal. In the Animals 
Act 196 7 the legislature has recognised the harmful effect wool 
marks can have on the marketing of wool in competition with other 
fibres and has therefore forbidden the marking of wool except by 
approved preparations (31). It is understood that the marking 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
Seep. 33 infra. 
Stock Act 1893, s.56; Stock Act Amendment Act 1895, s.7; 
Stock Act Amendrrent Act 1898, s.14; Stock Act 1908, s.61; 
Stock Amendment Act 1956 s.3; Animals Act 1967, s.69. 
Animals Act 1967, s.94 subs. (3) provides a penalty on 
summary conviction of a fine not exceeding two hundred 
dollars. cf. Stock Act 190 8, s. 61 where "pitch, tar, 
paint, raddle or lamp-black mixed with oil or tallow ... 
to be plainly made with distinct letters" was one of the 
methods prescribed by the Act for marking sheep. 
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of sheep has now fallen into desuetude compared with its use during 
the era when the present Chattels Transfer Act was enacted. 
"Earmarking" is the most widely used method of marking animals 
for identification purposes and for purposes of recording age, sex 
and ownership. The stringent requirements as to the registration 
and use of brands (which under the Animals Act 196 7 includes 
earmarks) should theoretically mean that the best practicable 
method of identifying sheep or cattle should be by reference to an 
earmark. Al though this is largely true ,even here there are 
difficulties. A farmer who buys replacement or store stock for 
fattening will be bringing on to his farm animals which already 
carry the earmark of another farmer. In many cases it may be 
impossible for the purchaser to super-impose his own mark on the 
new stock ( 32) . 
Are there then any better methods of identification available? 
Sex may be of assistance in the case of rams or bulls in a small 
flock or herd but is generally an insufficient method of 
identification. Age is of assistance in the case of young 
animals, e.g. calves, heifers, lambs and hoggets ,but after the 
animal matures the only sure method of age determination is by 
looking at the .ani.mal' s teeth (33) . Name could only be appropriate 
(32) The Animals Act 1967, s.83 allows a purchaser to brand new 
stock with his registered brand provided that he does not 
place his brand over the whole or any part of the existing 
brand. 
(33) For example in the case of a sheep from 1 1/2 to 2 1/2 years, 
its set of teeth comprise two large teeth and in the 
following two years four and six teeth respectively, after 
which it has a "full mouth" and age can no longer be 
precisely determined. 
( 
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with a small number of animals and even then, in the absence of 
some other identifying feature, one must rely on the owner or sorre 
other person to say that a particular ram is "Garry" since an 
animal's narre in the absence of sorre other description is very much 
a subjective matter. Lastly colour is at least for most cattle 
and sheep quite unhelpful as a means of identification. One may 
ask why the legislature failed to specify breed as one of the modes 
of description of stock since this form of identification enjoys 
the advantages of being absolutely immutable, (unlike a brand, mark 
or earmark), easy to see (unlike age, narre, or even sex (34))and 
there is today a sufficient number of breeds of both sheep and 
cattle in New Zealand for this factor to be, if not a sole rreans 
of identification, at least one which may narrow the field down 
to a considerable extent. Yet even if an animal's breed was used 
as a means of description serious problems could arise in the case of 
after-acquired stock under s. 29 if these are of a different breed 
from the stock originally secured under the instrument. 
Despite the nurrerous rrethods of description allowed by the 
Chattels Trans fer Act the mortgagee of sheep and cattle has, at 
least under s .28, a very limited choice as to the method he will 
employ to achieve a description which renders the secured animals 
reasonably capable of identification. 
The leading decision on the description requirement of s.28 
(34) e.g. It can sometirres be impossible to tell whether a 
particular sheep is a ewe or a wether without catching the 
animal and making a closer investigation. 
-16-
is the Official 'Assignee of Bailey v. Union Bank of Australia (35). 
Bailey purported to assign to the Union Bank by an instrument duly 
registered under the Chattels Transfer Act a herd of cattle and 
certain sheep depasturing on his land together with all after-
acquired stock. The schedule to the instrument described the 
stock as: 
All that flock of sheep comprising 500 ewes of mixed 
ages 250 lambs of mixed sexes. Also that herd of cattle 
comprising 49 heifers and 1 bull. All which sheep and 
cattle are earmarked with the registered earmark of the 
grantor ... (36) 
The schedule also described the land on which the stock were 
depasturing. The instrument contained a covenant by Bailey with 
the Bank "that the grantor ' will brand' and will earmark as shown 
in the schedule hereto" but no brand was shown on the instrument 
or the schedule. Bailey sold the sheep and purchased 28 cows with 
the proceeds. None of the stock either at the date of the 
instrument nor subsequently bore the grantor's brand as shown in 
the instrument and it was admitted that they could not by means of 
the description given be distinguished from 28 additional cows 
subsequently acquired by Bailey who had not observed his covenants 
to brand and earmark. 
After Bailey's adjudication in bankruptcy the bank seized and 
sold the stock depasturing on his farm including 77 cows (being 
the 49 original heifers plus 2 8 cCMs acquired with the proceeds of 
( 3 5) [ 19 16 ] N. Z . L. R. 9 ( S . C. ) and 8 7 3 (C. A. ) . 
( 3 6) ibid p . 8 7 4 . 
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sale of the sheep}, 1 bull (not being the original bull but 
acquired after the date of the instrument), 3 yearling heifers 
(the progency of some of the 49 heifers) and 8 calves or weaners, 
2 horses (after-acquired) and one pony. 
On an originating summons the Court was asked to decide 
whether the Bank or the Official Assignee was entitled to retain 
the proceeds of the sale. The Official Assignee argued that the 
instrument was void as against h im because the original 49 heifers 
and 1 bull were not within s.28 (37) but were in fact actually 
misdescribed in that they were not earmarked with the grantor's 
earmark. The plaintiff argued that unless stock belonging to the 
grantor are properly described at the time of execution of the 
instrument they would not be covered by a covenant to earmark. 
Chapman J. in the Supreme Court held that the description 
by sex and approximate age was in the circumstances sufficient to 
render the herd reasonably capable of identification unless an 
objection dependent on the absence of brands was to prevail. The 
learned Judge observed that description by reference to brands or 
marks in s.28 was alternative to that "by sex, age, name, colour, 
or other mode of description" so that one or the other would 
suffice. Chapman J. showed a sound insight into the practical 
difficulties of describing livestock referred to earlier in this 
paper. 
(37) s.25 of the 1908 Act. 
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"A description by sex may leave some room for doubt, 
just as a description by colour may: ... a description 
by name may be equally defective, save in the case of 
a domesticated beast which will answer to its naITe. 
A dairy-farmer's herd of heifers or milch-cows is, 
however, in itself a fairly definite thing." (38) 
Had it not been for the further complication of after-acquired 
stock being mixed in with and indistinguishable from the original 
49 heifers there may be good business reasons to adopt Chapman J. 's 
somewhat rugged approach to the description requirerrent of s. 28. 
The policy behind his decision appears to be that the same 
strictness of description required by the English Bills of Sales 
Act and the cases decided thereunder for all chattels including 
stock was not appropriate, in the case of livestock, to New Zealand 
con di ti ons . 
"The lending of money on stock is a regular business in 
New Zealand; and to it the same kind of suspicion and 
even discredit, that appears to attach to moneylending 
transactions involving bills of sale in England, does 
not attach." (39). 
Yet the fact that lending on a particular type of security is common 
in a country should not in itself justify a lessening of the standard 
of description required for such chattels. If anything, widespread 
borrowing on the security of livestock may render a strict 
description requirement even more necessary and desirable to protect 
borrowers. However the predominant and underlying philosophy behind 
the above quote is that the description requirements handed down by 
(38) Of"fi 'cial Assignee of BaiEy v. Union Bank of Australia [1916] 
N.Z.L.R. 9 at 16-17 (S.C.) hereinafter referred to as 
B'ailey (S.C.). 
(39) Bailey (S.C.) 15. 
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English case law should be relaxed in New Zealand to favour lenders 
so that agricultural borrowers will find it easier to obtain 
financial accommodation. 
Another justification for a different approach in New Zealand 
is of course the comparative numbers of stock involved. Whereas 
in England many farmers and even their neighbours might know their 
animals by name er individual appearance (40) the same could not 
be true of New Zeal and farming con di ti ons with its large numbers 
of livestock and comparatively sparse human population. 
The decision of Chapman J. on the compliance of the instrument 
in question as to description under s.28 was reversed by the Court 
of Appeal (41). Sim J. stated that the case was not one where it 
was claimed that a general description, correct as far as it went, 
might be treated as a compliance with the section. On the contrary 
he regarded it as an instance where it was sought to treat a serious 
misdescription as a sufficient description for the purposes of the 
section (42). Edwards J. considered that the New Zealdn Act 
required even greater particularity of description than s.4 of the 
English Bills of Sale Act 1882 and that the purpose of the requirement 
(40) " in a country parish in England every farmer and every 
farm labourer in the parish would know everyone of the 
cows in question by sight, and that the case is very 
different with respect to 47 cattle on a farm in New 
Zealand" Edwards J. [1916] N.Z.L.R. (C.A.) 881. 
(41) [1916] N.Z.L.R. 873 hereinafter referred to as Bailey (C.A.) 
Stout C.J., Edwards J., Cooper J., Sim J. 
( 4 2 ) Bai 1 ey 8 8 2 ( C • A. ) • 
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of s.28 as declared in that section is to ensure that the stock 
shall be reasonably capable of identification. Reviewing the 
English decisions on the meaning of this requirement Edwards J. 
found that the test whether or not the description of chattels 
was sufficient to meet the statute was whether or not the chattels 
mortgaged could be identified with reasonable certainty. This 
test was in His Honour's opinion expressed in direct terms in the 
Act. Applying that test to the facts before him the learned judge 
found it "beyond question" that the provisions of s .2 8 had 
not been complied with. 
"If, using the words of Lord Justice Kay in Davidson v. 
Carlton Bank (43), the Official Assignee in this case had 
gone upon the land rrentioned in the schedule, taking the 
schedule in his hand and applying it to the cattle which 
he found there, he would not only have failed to find 
a single beast which corresponded with the description 
in the schedule, but he would have found that by far the 
greater number of ihe beasts which were there bore earmarks 
totally different from that mentioned in the schedule ... 
How then can it be said that each beast was described in 
such a way as to enable a person dealing with Bailey to 
identify these which were intended to pass with the 
security?" (44) 
The "reasonably capable of identification" test was considered 
in relation to pigs in The King v. Buckland & Sons Ltd. (45) which 
were described in the schedule to the bill of sale as "l white sow 
(dry) ., 1 black-and-white saw, 6 'young' 1 week, 6 'young 5 weeks, 
(43) [1893] 1 Q.B. 82, 87, Lord Justice Kay's statement was 
cited with approval by Herdman J. in The King v. 
Buckland & Sons Ltd. [1922] N.Z.L.R. 683, 686. 
(44) Bailey 882 (C. A.). 
(45) [1922] N.Z.L.R. 683. 
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8 'young' 2 weeks, 8 'young' 5 weeks, 7 slips, 10 slips 1 45 young 
slips." There was a covenant in the instrument that the gran tor 
"will brand" but the animals were not branded nor earmarked. In 
an action for damages for conversion of chattels by the grantee 
against the defendant company of auctioneers which had sold the 
pigs without knowledge of the plaintiff's bill of sale, it was 
held that only the "white sow (dry)" and the "black-and-white sow" 
were sufficiently described for the purposes of s.28. 
Herdman J. stated that the object of the legislation was to 
enable interested persons to avoid confusing stock which is the 
subject of a chattel mortgage from stock which is unencumbered 
and that the method of distinguishing one animal from another 
adopted in the case of the porkers, the slips and the young pigs 
did not achieve that purpose. The learned judge stated that the 
sex and the colour of the young pigs and the porkers might have been 
given in the instrument but this had not been done. 
Yet even if the sex and colour of the pigs which were found 
to be insufficiently described had been given one might ask whether 
this would have been sufficient information "to enable any person, 
taking the schedule in his hand and applying fr. to the subject 
matter, to identify the chattels assigned without the aid of any 
other document" ( 46) . It is felt that the judges in this case as in 
Bailey's case (Court of Appeal) have approached the difficult subject 
of identifying .livestock too much influenced by the consideration 
(46) per Kay L.J. in Davidson v. Carlton Bank loc. cit. 87 
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applying to inventory description and insufficiently appreciative 
of the special complexities involved with describing a living 
"chattel". The writer suggests that even if the young pigs and 
the porkers had also been referred to by colour and sex they may 
still have been confused with other animals on the property not within 
the security. With many everyday chattels such as motor vehicles 
or electrical appliances an exact rreans of identification can 
easily be achieved by reference to a serial number and or a brand 
narre. Likewise many chattels can be given a permanent distinctive 
mark to denote ownership by a particular person. However 
distinctive marking in the case of livestock is a far more 
difficult task. Not only must the animal be initially caught and 
marked but on later occasions it will be necessary to get close 
enough to the animal to check its brand or earmark. In the case 
of a large herd or stock the only way to be sure that all animals 
bear the correct mark is to catch and examine each one in turn, a 
most time-consuming exercise. Therefore it is submitted that 
when dealing with a reasonably large number of stock of the same 
breed which are similar in appearance e.g. sheep, poultry (47) 
pigs .orcattle one of two rrethods of description can be adopted. 
(47) Palmer & Co. Ltd. v. New Zealand Farmers' Co-operative 
Distributing Co. Ltd. [1924] N.Z.L.R. 280. The difficulties 
presented by this case had to be cured by special 
legislative enactrrent, namely s.30 which, inter alia, 
excludes the operation of s .2 8 in the case of poultry. 
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Either an exactitude of marking or description must be attained 
which would be enormously difficult and time-consuming or 
alternatively one should settle for the best general description 
available and tie this in with a description of the land or 
premises on which the stock are to be found ( 48). Any stock could 
be excepted from this general description on sufficient proof 
being given that they belonged to someone else, e.g. a 
neighbouring farrrer whose sheep have slipped through the 
grantor's boundary fence ( 49) . 
Although there has been no recent litigation turning on the 
description of stock under s.28 of the Chattels Transfer Act this 
is attributable to factors described elsewhere in this paper (50) 
(48) A similar method has been accepted as a sufficient 
description in the United States, "see County Bank v. 
Hulen Mo. App 195 S.W. 74 and pp 66-70 of this paper. 
(49) This approach. is recommended by a Masterton solicitor 
who states: 
"If ever a case arose for proper identification of 
livestock, the ear-mark system could well break down. 
I see no reason why all livestock on a given property 
should not prima facie be deerred to be the property of 
the land occupier subject to any livestock being 
excluded from a security on satisfactory p roof of a 
Bailiff or an Official Assignee that in fact that stock 
belong to some other person." 
(50) See pp. 63-64 of this paper. 
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rather than to the quality or suitability of the section (51). 
(51) The doubts as to the suitability of the description of 
livestock requirements of the Act are well expressed 
in the following paragraphs of letters from Masterton 
and Te Awamutu practitioners respectively to the writer: 
"We have not had any difficulty in describing livestock, 
but again the apparent lack of difficulty may be due to 
the lack of enforcement action. Difficulties only appear 
when enforcement takes place and there are competing 
claims. The Chattels Transfer Act refers to "brand, 
ear-mark and mark." Branding is now a thing of the 
past and often the only branding which is done is an 
internal numbering system for the farmer's own records 
and convenience. Ear-marking is still, of course, 
current but is often honoured more in the breach than 
in the observance. A number of farmers "deal" in 
livestock. This means that they purchase livestock, 
fatten and sell. Often the holding period is fairly 
short and they do not bother to re-earmark for the 
brief period they have the stock on the property. 
Thus, if ever a case arose for proper identification of 
livestock, the ear-mark system could well bre~< down. 
I see no reason why all livestock on a given property 
should not prima facie be deemed to be the property of 
the land occupier subject to any livestock being 
excluded from a security on satisfactory proof of a 
Bailiff or an Official Assignee that in fact the stock 
belong to some other person." 
"Branding - the present provisions for branding and 
earmarking would seem to be unsatisfactory. Most 
Instruments provide for the Granter to brand and 
earmark but in practise this would rarely be carried 
out. Most farmers would perhaps use their own marking 
systems for identifying stock whi eh would not be in 
accordance with the Instrument." 
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(d) After-acquired stock; s.29 
The judicial interpretation given to s .29 (52) has circumvented 
some of the difficulties of description referred to in the 
preceding discussion on s.28. The "covenant to brand" implied in 
all instruments over livestock by virtue of s .29 has been used as a 
fictional device tn save what might otherwise be insufficient 
descriptions under the Act. 
The Court of Appeal decision in Bailey's case best illustrates 
the operation of this "empty formality" (53) upon which a valid 
security over stock may often depend. It will be recalled that 
Chapman J. 's decision in the Supreme Court that the description 
of the cattle had complied with the requirenents of s. 2 8 was 
reversed on appeal. However the majority (54) held that though 
the instrurrent was not \alid for the purposes of s.28 the provision 
in s .29 that an instrument comprising stock shall be deerred to 
include all the stock the property of the granter which he has 
covenanted to brand or mark, and whi eh are depasturing on the land 
mentioned in the instrument, made the security valid. 
Stout C.J. said it was clear on the facts that the stock 
des.cribed in the schedule of the instrument were neither 
(52) The most thorough text on this section is Ball, 
Law of Chattels Transfer (1940) 63-67. 
(53) Cain, The Chattels Transfer Act (1959) N.Z.L.J. 87, 89. 
(54) Stout C .J., Cooper and Sim J .J. (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
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branded (55), nor earmarked as stated in the schedule. He was of 
the opinion that because the instrument could be interpreted as 
imposing a covenant to earmark on the grantor as shown in the 
schedule, there was a sufficient compliance to let in the operation 
of s.29. This view of s.29 raises the question whether a covenant 
to earmark present cattle which already have a different earmark 
from that shown in the instrurrent is to be construed as requiring 
the cattle to be earmarked with the new earmark. His Honour 
answered this difficulty as follows: 
"If the covenant was so construed it would make s. 29 
quite inoperative in the majority of securities. Sheep 
and cattle are bought with earmarks and everyone assumes 
that they may acquire new earmarking. The question 
really is, was there a covenant to earmark as described? 
If there was, in my opinion this security comes within 
s.29 and is valid and effective." (56) 
The writer suggests that this reasoning is faulty. Although there 
may be good practical reasons for not requiring after-acquired 
cattle to be immediately earmarked with the earmark shown in the 
instrurrent, it seems inexcusable not to require those cattle owned 
by the grantor at the date of the instrurrent to be accurately 
described. Secondly this reasoning almost renders the description 
requirement of s.28 redundant so long as there is a covenant to 
brand or earmark in the instrument. 
(5 5) 
(56) 
In fact no brand was irentioned or described in the instrument, 
although a description of the earmark was given. The plaintiff 
argued that the words "will earmark" could refer only to sheep 
but this contention was not accepted by the Court: see Stout 
C.J. Bailey 876-877 (C.A.). 
Bailey (C.A.) 877. 
For the sake of uniformity it has been thought advisable to 
substitute references to sections in earlier enactrrents of the 
Chattels Transfer Act to the corresponding sections in the 
1924 Act. 
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The Chief Justice went on to justify this interpretation by 
invoking the golden rule of interpretation, that is to try to give 
effect to all the words in a statute or docurrent. He said that if 
there is an instrument to which s.28 is applicable, that instrument 
can have no effect if the conditions mentioned in that section are 
not complied with. This the writer submits, was the factual 
situation in Bailey's case since surely s.28 should have applied at 
least to the cattle originally mortgaged. His Honour then went on 
to say that if the condition as to branding or marking has not been 
complied with the security may be good under s.29 if there is a covenant 
to brand or mark and the lands on which the cattle are depasturing 
are described. Yet it is suggested that this approach contradicts 
the golden rule referred to by the learned Chief Justice in two 
ways. Firstly it fails to give effect to the words of s.28 and 
treats them as \Zi..rtually redundant in an instrurrent containing a 
covenant to brand, and secondly it fails to give effect to the words 
of s.29 itself (57). 
Both these failures were clearly revealed by Edwards J. in 
his dissenting judgrrent. Comrrenting on the majority interpretation 
he said: 
(57) It is submitted that the fourth to last sentence of Stout 
C.J. 's judgrrent in Baileys case may indicate that His Honour 
felt somewhat uneasy about his interpretation of the 
combined effects of ss. 28 and 29: "If the meaning I 
have given to these two sections is incorrect, then the 
present system of advances on stock mortgages will have 
to be changed." p.878. 
-2 8-
"It is contended, however, that, although s. 2 8 in the clearest 
possible language declares that the instrument shall be void, 
in the circumstances of the present case .... , nevertheless 
s.29 gives the bank the sane security as would have been given 
by an instrument in all respects scrupulously regular within 
the provisions of s.28. If that is indeed the true 
construction of this enactment it is, I venture to think, 
the most astonishing piece of legislation which it has been 
the duty of any Court to construe." (5 8) 
His Honour warned that this construction would sweep away the 
protection given by the statute to persons giving credit to stock-
owners and that it would render s.28 worse than a "meaningless 
absurdity but an actual trap" to those who relied upon its 
provisions: 
" ... the mortgagee who knowingly acquiesces in the deliberate 
disregard of the provisions of s.28 is as fully secured as 
if the instrunent under which he claims had complied 
strictly with these provisions, and as if all the covenants 
which by the schedule to the Act are implied in such 
instruments had been scrupulously observed. Nay, the 
mortgagee is .in an even better position, for he enables the 
mortgagor to maintain a fictitious credit which it is to the 
interest of the mortgagee to support." (59) 
Edwards J. stated that the purpose of s. 29 was to overcome the 
difficulties of identification that would arise in the case of a 
natural increase of existing stock or where additional stock was 
brought onto a farm or station of the sane description as the 
mortgaged stock and would be lranded with the sane brands. Since 
in such cases it would be impossible to distinguish between the 
stock included in the security and the additional stock depastured on 
the same lands and branded with the same brands s.29 was enacted to 
(58) Bailey 883 (C.A.). 
(59) Bai'ley (C.A.). 
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meet this difficulty by bringing such additional stock within 
the security. His Honour said that it was t h e weaning and i n t e nt of 
s.29 to: 
" .•• assume the existence of a mortgage of stock complete 
under s.28, and to add to the security thereby given (i) the 
natural increase of such stock, (ii) all stock the property 
of the granter branded or marked as specified in the 
instrument, (iii) all stock which the granter has covenanted 
or agreed by such instrument to so brand or mark, provided 
in the second and third cases that the stock are depasturing 
or are at, in, or upon any land or premises mentioned in 
the instrument or the schedule thereto." (60) 
As further support for his interpretation of s.29 Edwards J. 
stated that to include stock, not sufficiently described for the 
purposes of s.28 within the benefit of s.28 by their inclusion in 
category (iii) (of the preceding quoted passage) not only destroyed 
the effect of s. 28 but rendered rreaningless the following words of 
s. 29: "not only the stock comprised therein as provided by the last 
preceding section, but also ... " His Honour considered that these 
words, being in the opening sentence of s.29 were the controlling 
words of that section (61). 
It is not surprising that the majority decision in Bailey' s 
case ,although applied in Honore v. Farmers' Co-operative Auctioneering 
(62) , has been the subject of critical comment. Mr. Cain 
( 6 0 ) ib id. 8 8 5 . 
(61) ibid. 885-886. 
(62) [1923] N.Z.L.R. 56. In this case none of the stock mentioned 
in the schedule bore the brand described therein and all the 
original mortgaged stock had been sold and replaced. Herdman J. 
held that although the description was insufficient to comply 
with s.28, as the instrument contained a covenant to brand 
it covered the stock on the grantor's farm at the date of his 
bankruptcy under s. 29. It was also held that the fact that the 
brand was not registered under the Stock Act 1908 was immaterial. 
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states that: 
" ... the strong dissenting judgment of Edwards J. [in 
Bailey's case] is preferred by most lenders. It was 
there considered by the majority that, if existing stock 
were so described as not to comply with (now) s .28, they 
might be saved if complying with s.29; the better view 
seems to be that the two sections are mutually exclusive, 
and that beast charged at the date of the instrument 
should be described as required by s.28, with s.29 
assuming greater importance as individual beasts die or 
are removed." ( 6 3) 
Professor Gray in the Law of Personal Property (64) shares the 
same view as that given by Mr. Cain above and considers that this 
opinion: 
"is fortified by the circumstance that s.29 makes no 
provision avoiding the instrument in case of misdescription 
of the stock or land: hence, if present stock could be 
broughtwithin the ambit of s.29, s.28 (with its penalty) 
would l:e otiose." (65) 
However, Professor Gray acknowledges that the majority of the Court of 
Appeal in Bailey's case took the view that if an instrument failed to 
comply with s.28 it could be saved if it complied with s.29. 
Ball does not specifically direct himself to the issue as to 
whether stock on the properties at the time of the instrument and 
purported to be included therein must be described in accordance with 
s.28 (66) but does say -that it is desirable that an instrument to 
obtain the protection of ss.28 and 29, should contain, inter alia, 
an exact description of the stock at the time of the instrument (67). 
(63) The Chattels Trasfer Act (1959) 35 N.Z.L.J. 87, 89. 
(64) 5th ed. 
( 6 5 ) ibid. p . 14 8 . 
(66) See The Law of Chattels Trans fer (19 40) first complete 
paragraph on p.64, subheading (2). 
(6 7) ibid. p. 65. 
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This may be an implied acceptance of the fact that lenders should 
not place total reliance on the majority decision in Bailey' s case. 
The covenant to brand, mark or earmark assumes great 
significance under the Act by virtue of the interpretation placed 
by the Court on s.29 (68). It is therefore relevant to inquire 
into the meaning of this covenant which has been described by one 
writer as being in certain circumstances an "empty formality" or 
"fiction". The most thorough judicial treatment of the covenant 
to brand was given in Palmer & Co. Ltd. v. New Zealand Farmers' 
Co-operative Distributing Co. Ltd. (69) by Salmond J. who held that 
a covenant to brand on its true construction was insufficient to 
bring s.29 (70) into operation so as to include after-acquired 
poultry being upon land specified in the instrument. 
( 6 8) 
(6 9) 
(70) 
"A covenant to mark or brand is not a meaningless form of 
words inserted in an instrument for the purpose of bringing 
into operation s.26 of the Chattels Transfer Act. To be 
effective for this purpose it must, on its true construction 
as a term of the contract, impose upon the granter a legal 
obligation to mark or brand in a specified manner the after-
acquired stock claimed by the mortgagee in reliance on that 
covenant. To ascertain whether the clause in question has 
this effect it must be interpreted on the same principle as 
any other term in the contract. The question for determination, 
therefore, is whether the granter of the defendant's bill of 
sale has, on the true construction of that document, bound 
himself by a valid and operative covenant to "brand and ear-
mark "with his registered brands and ear marks" all poultry 
which he may afterwards possess upon the farm mentioned in 
the instrument. I consider that he has not. The covenant can 
only be reasonably construed as limited to sheep, cattle, 
and horses. " ( 71) 
e.g. Bailey's case s.c. & C.A. 
[1924) N.Z.L.R. 280, 282-3. 
s.26 Chattels Transfer Act 1908. 
(71) [1924) N.Z.L.R. 282-3. 
' .. 
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His Honour went on to state that the question is not whether the 
parties expected or understood that the stock in question would be 
branded but whether the grantor has bound himself by a valid covenant 
to do so. If he has, s. 29 applies even though the covenant is not 
perforrred or expected to be performed. 
While this judgrrent is to be commended for its decisive and 
unequivocal approach to the problem, the self- contrad.iction inherent 
in the decision may be a cause for uneasiness. This fault is clearly 
expressed by Mr. Cain when he says: 
"Hence (i.e. from the decision in Palmer's case) 
... there must be a valid covenant to brand,but it must 
not be "a meaningless form of words". A covenant to 
brand poultry was rreaningless (Palrrer's case) but it 
seems that to covenant to brand stock that can in fact 
be branded, but which the parties know the granter has 
no intention of branding is not rreaningless." (72) 
He concludes on this point that if poultry and other stock not 
capable of being branded are entitled by s. 30 to exemption from 
the covenant to brand, it seems reasonable to extend the exemption 
to stock which are not branded in the usual course of farming 
practice or to specifically exempt dairy stock from the branding 
covenant of s. 29. ( 73). 
Assuming that Mr. Cain when he speaks of a "covenant to brand" 
also refers to a covenant to mark or earmark, there is certain rrerit 
in his proposal to extend the exemption from a branding requirerrent 
to stock. not usually "branded" in practice / A nUTI]ber of experienced 
(72) (1959) 35 N.Z.L.R. 89. 
(73) s.30 was enacted in the 1924 Act after the decision in 
Palmer's case and no doubt to remedy the difficulties raised 
by that case for mortgagees of stock not capable of 
distinctive marking. 
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practitioners in this field have expressed their dissatisfaction 
with the existing position to the writer. A senior conveyancing 
partner in a Hamilton firm is of the opinion that: 
"The use of a brand is almost universally in discard, 
while even an earmark is used only occasionally (74) 
and is then often of little use, particularly for one who 
deals in stock, because of the difficulty of earmarking 
when the stock has already been earmarked with some 
other earmark." 
This opinion is reinforced by those of Masterton, Te Awamutu 
and Waipukurau solicitors, respectively: 
"The Chattels Trans fer Act refers to "brand, ear-mark and 
mark". Branding is nCM a thing of the past and often the 
only branding which is done is an internal numbering system 
for the farmer's own records and convenience. Ear-marking 
is still, of course, current but is often more honoured in 
the breach than in the observance." 
"The present provisions for branding and earmarking would 
seem to be unsatisfactory. Most instruments provide for 
the granter to brand and earmark but in practice this 
would rarely be carried out. Most farmers would perhaps 
use their own marking systems for identifying stock which 
would not be in accordance with the instrurrent." 
"The main difficulty (of the Act) is of identification. 
Where the fat lamb farmer buys in ewes from a number of 
flocks the earmarks are not much use. As far as branding 
is concerned, this is rarely used now and I do not think 
there is any longer a requirement to register a brand. 
This difficulty is why stock firms tend to lend a limit 
per head of $3 per sheep regardless of age, quality, 
breed, etc." (75) 
Nevertheless the amendment suggested by Mr. Cain is strictly 
speaking unnecessary in the case of s .2 8 because the branding or 
(74) Writer's note: With respect it is understood the earmarking 
particularly of sheep is still very prevalent in New Zealand. 
(75) Writer's note: For those unfamiliar with sheep prices a good 
store or fat lamb would fetch between $4 to $6; a 2 tooth 
breeding ewe $6 to $10; a fat wether $5 to $7. It is 
understood that generally stock firms will lend only 
about 50% on the total value of livestock. 
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marking requirement in that section i.s( not obligatory so long as 
the stock are otherwise referred to or described so as to be 
reasonably capable of identification. So far as s.29 is concerned 
there is some merit in Mr. Cain's proposal to exempt stock which 
are not branded (assuming this term embraces also earmarked or 
marked) in the usual course of farming practice. Yet this solution 
could raise as many problems as it seeks to answer. Since "stock 
which cannot be p:-operly the subject of distinctive marking" are 
already exempted by s. 30 all that are left are stock which can 
properly be the subject of distinctive marking. Given that the 
practice of earmarking sheep or cattle may vary from farm to farm 
and district to district who is to say whether it is usual or 
not to mark such stock in the course of farming practice? The 
writer suggests that a better way to meet the problem is to delete 
the words "branded, earmarked, or marked as specified in the 
instrument, or which the grantor has covenanted or agreed by such 
instrument so to brand, earmark or mark, and" from s. 29 and 
substitute therefor "and which are reasonably capable of 
identification as being the property of the granter". Such an 
amendment would have the effect of including all after-acquired 
stock of a class in a mortgage of present stock of that class. 
It could be argued that such an amendment is unduly favourable 
to grantees. In -the writer's opinion there would be little 
substance in this type of criticism because the amendment does 
little more than reflect the effect of existing law and what the 
existing law is generally understood to mean by the parties. 
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At the same time it obviates the need for the covenant to 
brand "fiction". It .is submitted that any alternative would 
make the identification requirement an extremely onerous and time 
consuming task and would tend to make lending on the security of 
livestock an unattractive proposition. Essentially, the writer 
feels that one must acknowledge the peculiar complexity of 
describing livestock for the purposes of an instrument by way of 
security and adopt a practical albeit a different approach from 
the description of other chattels. Any granter who is unhappy 
with encumbering his future class of stock in this way has only 
to insert in his instru:rrent a clause expressly excluding the 
operation of s.29. 
(e) Description of land 
The Act is not explicit on the consequences of a failure to 
describe the land on which livestock are depasturing. In Lee v. 
Official Assignee of Parke (76) it was held that non-compliance 
with the requirement of s. 2 8 ( 77) that "the land or premises on 
which such stock are shall be described or mentioned in such 
instrument or schedule" did not invalidate the instru:rrent 
between the parties but, if registered, deprived the grantee of 
the benefit of the registration. However, · a careful reading 
of s.28 itself suggests a different answer. The section states 
(76) [1903] N.Z.L.R. 747; applied in Silk v. Dalgety & Co. Ltd. 
[1923] N.Z.L.R. 1065. 
(77) Then s.34 Chattels Transfer Act 1889. 
-36-
that unless stock are branded, marked or described so as to be 
reasonably capable of identification the instrument shall be void 
to the extent and as against the persons mentioned in s.18. The 
second part of the section,which is divided from the first part 
by a semi-colon, reads: 
" ... , and the land or premises on which such stock are 
or are intended to be depastured or kept shall be 
described or mentioned in such instrument or schedule. " 
If it had been intended that non-compliance with this latter 
requirement should render the instrument void then surely the 
description of land requirement would have been included in with 
the description of stock provision in the main body of the section 
and it would be clearly stated that a non-compliance with either 
would invalidate the instrument. Moreover the second part of 
s. 2 8 appears to allow a certain flexibility or independence of 
the stock from the land in that the words "land on which such stock 
are or are intended to be depastured" suggest that the 
legislature has contemplated a situation where the mortgaged stock 
will not in fact be on the land. Yet if this is the case why 
should a failure to describe the land invalidate the instrument if 
the stock are othe:rwise reasonably capable of identification? It 
is submitted that 1he purpose of the land description requirement in 
s.28 is to inform grantees that if they fail to describe the land 
or misdescribe it, although their instrument is not thereby void, 
they do so at their peril. In the words of Edwards J.: 
"The 2 8th section having provided that for the purpose 
of identification of the stock mortgaged it shall be 
sufficient to describe such stock by some brand or 
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brands or other marks upon them, it at once becomes 
apparent that in the absence of some further provision 
endless disputes might arise as to the identity of the 
stock mortgaged. To meet this difficulty the concluding 
paragraph of s.28 provides that the land or premises on 
which such stock are shall be described or mentioned in 
the instrument or schedule." ( 78) 
What then in view of Lee's case is the situation where stock 
are on the move from one property to another or have been removed 
for sale? Are they still covered by the security under s .28? 
Edward J. stated that: 
"Section 2 8 does not, however, confine the security 
thereby given to stock otherwise s uf fi ciently described 
while they are upon the lands so mentioned. Such stock 
if they can be identified, can be followed wherever they 
may be found. ( 79) 
It would appear that on this important question there are a 
number of possible views as to the effect of non-compliance with 
the description of land requirement in s.28 : 
i. Non-compliance renders the instrument incapable of 
registration under the Act or if registered deprives 
the grantee of the benefit of such registration: 
Lee's case. 
ii. Non-compliance renders the instrument incapable of 
registration but provided stock can be identified 
independently of the land then a valid registered 
security retains the protection of the Act even if 
the stock are subsequently removed from that land. 
Edwards J. in Bailey' s case. 
iii. Non-compliance does not render the instrument void 
and incapable of registration but the stock in 
question must be reasonably capable of identification 
under s.28 and if a grantee omits to correctly 
describe the land he does so at his peril, since 
his security will stand or fall by the description 
of the stock there being no sufficient description 
of land to rely on as well. 
( 7 8 ) ib i d. 8 8 4- 8 8 5 . 
(79) Bailey 885 (C.A.). 
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It is considered that (i) and (ii) above read together represent 
the present law though not necessarily the best interpretation 
of s.28 and that (iii) although preferred by the writer, is 
against the weight of authority. 
If the land is not made an essential part of the description 
then as Edwards J. commented, enormous difficulties would be 
involved for a lender advancing money on a herd or flock because 
he would have to rely on the description of the animals which, 
as shown earlier in the paper, can be a most uncertain and 
difficult exercise to accomplish. Yet if land is an essential 
part of the description then third parties could be deceived into 
lending on stock which is subject to a security but is not on 
land shown in the instrument. There are also difficulties with 
stock on the move, temporarily on another paddock or farm, or 
which have strayed (80), not to mention innocent misdescription 
of land due to clerical errors or incorrect information being 
supplied ( 81) . 
The words "or any land and premises used and worked as part 
of the first mentioned land and premises, whether or not such stock 
(80) Fortunately for reasons given elsewhere in this paper many of 
these problems under modern New Zealand farming conditions are 
academic rather than practical. 
(81) In In re Fairbrother Official Assignee v. Baddeley (1905) 
25 N.Z.L.R. 546, Stout C.J. at 548 took a sensible approach to 
a clerical error in the inisdescription of land in holding 
that"the blunder of substituting [lot] "23" for "25" seeing 
that the rest of the description is correct ought not to 
invalidate the instrument. 
-39-
be removed therefrom" have not yet been the subject of judicial 
consideration. The Hon. Mr. Lee (Minister of Justice) stated 
during the debates on the 1922 Chattels Transfer Arrendment Bill 
that the reason for the amendment to the principal Act by adding 
the words "whether or not such stock may be afterwards removed 
therefrom" was to provide: 
" ... that the security is to remain over stock if the stock 
is removed from the land on which it was originally 
depastured. It happens sometimes that there is a bill 
of sale by way of security over stock, and the farmer 
may buy an adjoining field and remove the stock to it. 
At the present time the stock affected by the bill of 
sale must remain where they were when the bill of sale 
was made. This removes that difficulty. (82) 
In 1924 the further words "or any land and premises used and 
worked as part of the first mentioned land and premises" were added. 
It seerred to be the view of the Government members that the addition 
only reflected the existing law after the 1922 Amendment Act (83). 
The member for Timaru, Mr. F .J. Rolleston stated 
"it is quite reasonable that stock should still be 
covered although perhaps not on the land. It would 
not be reasonable to say that because stock were 
taken off the land the security would not stand." ( 84) . 
Ball considers that the effect of the words added in the 1924 
Act is to include other lands which, although not described in the 
instrument, are used and worked as though they were part of the land 
described in the instrument (85). The writer considers that this 
(82) Hansard (1922) Vol. 198 774. 
(83) Hansard (1924) Vol. 205, p.635; the member for Hamilton 
Mr. Young. 
(84) ibid. p.637. 
(85) Law of Chattels Transfer p.67. 
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view is borne out both by the words themselves and also the 
intention of the legislature as indicated in Hansard. 
It is therefore submitted that s.28 be recast so that a 
failure to describe the land or premises on which stock are kept 
or depasturing shall not void the instrument as against the persons 
mentioned in s.18 unless the stock are not reasonably capable 
of identification without reference to the land. 
(f) Sale of Stock by Granter 
It is obvious that if a farner is to carry out his normal 
operations he must have some freedom to dispose of stock. Yet 
in the case of mortgaged stock any such disposal of stock will 
of course diminish the grantee's security. The implied covenant 
in clause 9 of the Fourth Schedule to the Act and the interpretation 
placed on it by the Courts endeavour to balance this conflict 
of interest. Encumbered stock may only be sold by the grantor 
during the ordinary course of business, but no sale shall be made 
so as to reduce the number of the stock stated in the security. 
An interesting Parliamentary battle preceded the enactnent of 
this covenant in its present form. Clause 9 of the Bill 
originally presented to the House of Representatives in 1924 
contained the words "or to reduce the present value of the stock 
for the time being subject to this security to less than the 
market value of the stock originally covered by this security" 
after the words "so as to reduce the number of the stock stated 
in this security" which appear in the present clause. Opposition 
members described the requirement on the grantor to keep stock 
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up to its original value as "absurd" and " farcical" (86). The 
principal arguments against this provision were the drastic 
fluctuations which could occur in the value of stock, especially 
during times of economic recession. 
A further practical difficulty cited was the inevitable 
seasonable variations in the value of stock. For example a sheep 
would be less valuable after shearing when its years clip of 
wool had been removed than before when it was carrying this extra 
asset on its back. Mr. Lynsar agreed that in view of the severe 
penalty imposed by the Act on a granter who impaired the amount of 
his security it would be quite unjust and impractical to retain 
the value require:rrent: 
"Everything is done to tie these unfortunate people up 
in an unmerciful way , without any consideration. Farmers 
do not understand business documents unless the language 
is plain. " (87) 
In reply the Minister of Justice the Hon. Mr. Parr said that 
ordinarily if a man gives a mortgage over anything, he cannot sell 
without the consent of the mortgagee but that there had always been 
a departure from that principle with regard to chattels and stock 
in particular. He considered it absolutely reasonable that if a 
far.rne.r wished to sell his secured stock he was free to do so in 
(86) Mr. Lynsar (Gisborne) stated: "I know any number of people 
who before the slump paid ~12 and ~14 for cattle. I myself 
bought at prices up to f;l8. But when the slump came those 
cattle were not worth more than £3. 11 
Hansard (1924) Vol. 205 p.633. 
(87) ibid. 634. 
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the ordinary cnurse of business, provided that the value of the stock 
was kept up to the value at the date when he gave the bill of sale. 
In the case where he wanted to sell and reduce the value, all he had 
to do was to get the consent of the mortgagee (88). However, the 
opposition prevailed and the Government agreed to omit any 
requirerrent for the farrrer to keep up the value of his stock from 
the Bill, which is the position in the present Act (89). 
The power of sale in the ordinary course of business was 
explained by Sim J. delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
in National Bank v. Dalgety & Co. (90). 
"That power has been conferred for the purpose of enabling 
the mortgagor to carry on his business and to pay debts 
incurred in the course of carrying on that business. 
If in every case he had to pay the proceeds to the 
mortgagee it would mean a realisation of the mortgagee's 
security and would put an end very soon to the 
mortgagor's business. " 
This case was an action for damages for conversion by the allegedly 
wrongful sale of stock comprised in an instrument by way of security 
brought by the grantee against the grantor and the party to whom 
the proceeds of the sale had been paid. The Court rejected the 
argument that the proceeds of such a sale should be paid to the 
grantee. It also held that the covenant not to remove the stock 
must be read subject to the proviso that when the grantor was 
entitled ta s .ell stock he was entitled to remove them from the 
( 88) 
(89) 
(90) 
ibid. 638-6 39. 
Seep ,.40. of this paper. 
[ 19 2 5 ] N • Z • L. R. 2 5 0 at 2 5 5 • 
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station for that purpose. The condition that the number of 
stock left on the station after a sale is not to be less than the 
number stated in the instrument must be construed distributively 
so that where the instrument includes several classes of stock 
the number of any particular class must not be reduced below the 
number of that class stated in the instrument. If a grantor made 
a sale in excess of the number which he was authorised to sell the 
sale would be bad only to the extent of the excess. In that case 
the instrument stated the number of cattle as "549 or thereabouts " 
and the Court found that a sale by the defendant which reduced 
the number to 503 unsold was justified by the terms of the 
instrument and the question of conversion did not arise. 
In New Zealand Farmers Co-op. v. Canterbury Frozen Meat (1932) 
N.Z.L.R. 381 the grantee relied on a clause in the instrument 
which appointed the grantee to act as sole selling agent of all 
stock and produce of the grantor as negativing the grantee's 
implied covenant to sell in the ordinary course of business. It is 
understood that this type of covenant is invariably included in 
securities between stock and station agents and farrrers. The 
Court held that this clause did not negative the grantor's pc:wer of 
sale but only regulated it. The implied covenant to sell in the 
ordinary course of business gave the gr an tor a right to insist on 
a sale of surplus stock. If the sale is made by the granter in 
breach of the covenant the purchaser gets a good title and the 
remedy of the grantee is for damages for breach of contract. 
Of all the covenants implied or expressed in an instrument, 
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it would be difficult to better clause 9 Fourth Schedule for a 
provision which gives the granter the maximum of temptation 
combined with the maximum of opportunity. A careful reading of 
each obligation in clause 9 shows that unless a grantee is in a 
position to constantly supervise the grantor's farm and stock 
then it will be exceptionally difficult for him to learn of the 
non-observance of the covenants. For example the covenant forbidding 
removal is in practical terms quite impossible to enforce and 
almost as difficult to detect unless the grantee is sufficiently 
energetic to have the stock counted at regular intervals. 
Nevertheless it is probably unrealistic to criticise the 
covenants in clause 9 since in the final analysis it would be 
impossible to devise any legal provision which would protect an 
innocent party against fraud in such circumstances. For reasons 
dealt with elsehwere in this paper e1), despite the theoretical 
difficulties involved, in practice most of these problems are 
obviated by the character and business methods of the parties 
concerned. 
(g) Purchasers and auctioneers of encumbered stock 
In the writer's opinion a curious anomaly is presented on 
the question of the protection afforded by s.19 of the pres ent Act 
to the bona fide purchasers or auctioneers without express notice 
of encumbered stock. It is clear that such people are protected 
in the case of an unregistered instrurrent but what is the position 
where an instrurrent is "void to the extent and as against the 
(91) See pp. 
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persons mentioned in section eighteen" through non-compliance 
with s.28? Surely such purchasers and auctioneers are equally 
deserving of protection as the persons mentioned in s.18(1). 
In the 1908 Act s.16 (now S.18)had an additional subsection 
(3), absent from the present Act, which provided: 
"No instrument comprising stock, or made or executed in 
respect of wool or crops, shall be valid or effectual 
against any bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration 
without express notice, unless such instrument is duly 
registered under this Act. " 
Thus in The King v. Buckland & Sons Ltd. (92) Herdman J. held that: 
"As s.25 (now s.28) of the Chattels Transfer Act 1908 
provides that imperfectly described stock are not 
secured to the grantee of an instrument as against the 
persons rnentioned in s.16 (now s.18) of the Statute, it 
would seem to follow that a bona fide purchaser for value 
without notice (being a person mentioned in subs. 3 of 
s.16) who buys stock which are not reasonably capable of 
identification by reference to brands, or marks, or by 
reference to the other rneans of identification referred 
to in s.25, is protected. If, then, the buyer of such 
stock is secured from attack, why should an auctioneer, 
who sells the same stock bona fide and without any 
knowledge of the existence of a security, be held liable 
for wrongful conversion? 
To hold that such a person is responsible for moneys 
realised by the sale of the stock appears to savour of 
injustice, but nevertheless it seems that he is liable." 
Now by virtue of the present s .18 not even a bona fide purchaser 
for value without notice will be protected as against the grantee 
of an instrurnent which fails to comply with s.28. It is submitted 
that this position is totally unsatisfactory. Why should the grantee 
have the benefit of an instrument which does not describe the 
(92) [1922]N.Z.L.R. 683, 688-9. 
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chattels therein so that they are reasonably capable of 
identification by a person who has gone to the trouble of 
searching the register? 
This result in the case of stock securities does not appear 
to have been intended by the legislature when clause 2 of the 
Chattels Transfer Amendment Bill 1922 (93) was presented to the 
House. The then Minister of Justice, the Honourable Mr. Lee 
explained the purpose of the clause as follows : 
"The object of this clause is that those who hold 
instruments by way of security and do not register them 
within the appointed time shall not be able to contest 
the right of a subsequent purchaser for valuable 
consideration in respect of the ownership of the chattels. 
They have their opportunity to disclose their ownership 
by registration. It is also necessary to protect the 
auctioneer who sells those chattels. They are innocently 
sold, and it is wrong that the auctioneer should suffer." (94) 
The Member for Wairau, Mr. Mccallum approved of the clause because 
it extended the protection of the original Statute from stock, 
crops and wool to all property (95). However no one seems to 
have contemplated the result that extending subsection 16 (3) to 
cover all classes of property and making it into a new section (96) 
could have on the rights of a grantee whose instrurrent fails to 
comply with the present s.28. 
The writer suggests that the anomaly complained of could be 
cured by simply inserting the words "and section nineteen" after 
the words "secti.on eighteen" in section 28. 
(93) s.19 Chattels Transfer Act 1924. 
(94) Hansard (1924) Vol. 198 p.773-4. 
(95) ibid. p. 774. 
(96) s.19; 1924 Act. 
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(h) Wool Securities 
In every instrument by way of security comprising sheep there 
shall be implied,unless expressly negatived, a covenant by the 
granter that he will deliver to the grantee the wool shorn from 
such sheep in each year during the continuance of such instrument (97). 
The Act has provided a number of important protections for grantees 
of securities over wool. Thus a grantee is entitled to the wool 
of the sheep not only while growing but afterwards when shorn from 
the sheep and wherever such wool may be (98). The subsequent sale, 
bailrrent mortgage or other encumbrance of or affecting the sheep 
mentioned in the wool security shall not prejudicially affect a 
duly registered instrument or the rights of the grantee to the 
wool referred to therein (99) . Where sheep are already mortgaged 
the granter may within the terms of the written consent of the 
grantee give to a third person a valid security on the next 
ensuing clip of the wool of such sheep (100). If an instrument 
by way of security has been given over sheep and the instrument 
provides that the granter will give to the grantee an instrument 
over the wool growing or to grow upon such sheep or to require 
the granter to deliver to the grantee the wool shorn from such 
sheep during the continuance of such instrument, then, while the 
first rrentioned instrument lasts the grantee is deemed to have a 
lien or security over each clip in all respects as if an instrurrent 
(97) s.41(2) 1924 Act. 
(98) s.38. 
(99) s.39. 
( 10 0) s. 40 . 
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in respect of the wool had actually been executed and registered, 
and none of the subsequent dealings with the sheep referred to in 
s.39 will prejudicially affect the security (101). 
A number of questions are raised by these sections. In s.38 
there is no indication as to how the sheep whose wool is mortgaged, 
are to be referred to or described. One presumes that the same 
considerations would apply here as under ss. 2 8 and 29 and clause 12 
of the Fourth Schedule gives support to this view when it refers to: 
"the flock of sheep mentioned in this instrument, and t h e 
increase thereof, and all other sheep which if this 
instrument were an instrument by way of security over 
sheep would be included therein. " 
However, if the s.28 and s.29 description requirements are to 
apply equally to s. 38 then it would have been a simple matter for 
the Act to say so rather than leave the point in doubt. 
Under s.39 two matters arise for consideration; the rights 
of persons possessing interests in the sheep which are (i) prior 
and (ii) subsequent iD the interests of the grantee. On the question 
of p rior interests the Act is not explicit and in s.39 it only 
mentions the position in the case of a "subsequent " dealing with 
the sheep and that such dealing shall not p rejudicially affect 
the rights of a grantee under a duly registered instrument. What 
then are the grantee's rights against prior interests such as those 
of a landlord entitled to distrain for rent or a mortgagee of the 
sheep under a registered instrument? It is submitted that 
sufficient inferences can be drawn from the Act to imply a pa.ver 
in the grantee, on default of the grantor, to enter on the property, 
(101) s.41. 
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take possession of the sheep and shear and or seize the wool clip. 
If this were not so an instrument under s. 38 which "shall entitle 
the grantee to the wool of the sheep not only while growing" would 
be largely ineffectual unless the grantee had first obtained an 
agreement by the landlord whereby the latter consented to allow 
the grantee to enter on the property to enforce his security and 
to waive his right to distrain on the sheep and their wool for 
rent (102). In the case of a prior mortgagee of the sheep the 
question arises whether his "consent in writing" to the security 
over the wool under s.40 carried with it an implied paver to enter 
on the property and shear or seize the wool or whether such a power 
must be expressly "authorised" in such consent. In the absence 
of any authority on this point the writer submits that the only 
way that proper effect can be given to s.38 is to imply a power on 
the grantee to enter the property and shear and or seize the 
secured wool clip. This view is supported by the power to be implied 
in instruments by way of security over wool in clause 12 of the 
Fourth Schedule to the Act. This power states that, on default 
by the grantor the sheep "shall be shorn either by the grantor or 
by the grantee, at the option of the grantee ... and shall be 
delivered by the gr an tor to the grantee ... " Obviously the grantee's 
option to shear the sheep himself is useless unless he has the 
right to enter on the land, take possession of the sheep for the 
(102) It i s mde r stooc! that many lenders on the security of stock 
on leased land require an agreement by the landlord not to 
distrain before they will advance any money to the grantor 
of the instrument. 
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purposes of shearing and to remove the wool. Further support for 
the view that the grantee's rights may prevail against the prior 
interests in the sheep, provided of course that these interests 
have not already been exercised, is the provision in clause 12 
of the Fourth Schedule that: 
11 (the grantee) may from the proceeds ( of the sale of 
wool) pay himself the moneys hereby secured, and any 
rent payable to any landlord, and any moneys payable 
to any mortgagee or other person that he may be compelled 
to pay in order to protect his security over the said 
wool ••. 11 
This passage seems to imply that the grantee is not legally obliged 
to pay any moneys due from the granter to the landlord or any 
mortgagee out of the proceeds either before or after the grantee 
has paid himself for the moneys secured by the instrument but that 
he is empowered to make such paynents insofar as they are necessary 
to protect his security. Such a situation would arise where the 
landlord or mortgagee had commenced to exercise his interests 
and could thereby prevent the grantee from gaining access to the 
sheep. 
If the above view of the grantee's power as against prior 
interests is correct why then did the legislature deem it necessary 
in s. 39 to expressly de al with the rights of grantees as against 
the holders of subsequent interests in sheep? The same reasoning 
that implies a power as against a prior interest holder who has not 
exercised his interest applies a fortiori to a subsequent interest 
holder since the latter has notice of the wool security by virtue 
of s.4 of the Act. Therefore if the implied power applies to all 
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interest holders, both prior and subsequent, one may ask what is 
the purpose of s.39 which deals specifically with the rights of 
the grantee as against subsequent encumbrances. It is submitted 
that s.39 goes further than the implied power discussed above which 
subsists only between the granter and the grantee. Whereas under 
the implied power the grantee is in effect given the same rights to 
deal with the wool as the granter, s.39 extends the grantee's rights 
so that they operate not only against the granter but also against 
all persons acquiring subsequent interest in the sheep. Thus the 
writer submits that the grantee has no right to the wool against 
a prior mortgagee er the holder of other types of prior encumbrances 
who were in possession or had taken other steps to enforce their 
interest. However,as against a subsequent interest the grantee 
would by virtue of s.39 enjoy full rights under his security to 
get possession of and sell the wool, irrespective of whether the 
holders of such subsequent interests had taken steps to realise 
their security or not. (10 3) 
(i) Variation of Priorities of Registered Instruments 
The present law relating to priorities among competing 
instruments is a cause of dissatisfaction and even uncertainty among 
practitioners. Section 22 provides that where two or more 
ins.truments are executed comprising wholly or partly the s arre 
(103) For a discussion of the parallel Australian provisions 
relating to wool securities see Francis, The Law and 
Practice in all States of Australia Relating to Mortgages and 
Securities (1964), 328-9 and Sykes, Crop and Wool Lien 
Complexities (1959) 33 A.L.J. 43 and 67. 
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chattels, priority is gi..ven to such instrument or instruments in 
the order of the time of their respective registrations provided 
that where the grantee under a second or subsequent instrument 
claims priority by virtue of prior registration he must prove that 
at the time his instrument was executed he had no notice of any 
existing unregistered instrument. 
The question which this Section raises is whether a subsequent 
grantee can achieve :i;riori ty by obtaining the prior grantee's 
consent in a Deed of Variation of priorities. If this is not 
possible then at any time when grantees have agreed to vary the 
priority of their instruments from the order shown on the register 
all instruments registered prior to that to which the grantees 
have now agreed to accord priority would have to be discharged. 
The latter approach would appear to be unnecessarily cumbersome 
and a duplication of effort,for the prior instruments thus discharged 
would have to be re-registered immediately after the registration 
of the instrument to which the prior grantees have now agreed to 
yield priority. Not only is this method a duplication of effort 
but it also carries wi.th it the risk that the re-registered 
instruments may become voidable securities under s.57 of the 
Insolvency Act 1967 (104) even though the identical form of such 
secur.i ties were originally registered over twelve months before the 
(104) This section provides, inter alia, that every security or 
charge over any property of a bankrupt will be voidable as 
against the Assignee of the bankrupt's estate if it is 
executed or given by the debtor within the period commencing 
twelve months immediately before the filing of a creditor's 
petition in bankruptcy. This provision does not apply in the 
case of money actually advanced or paid or any other valuable 
consi9eration given in good fait~ by the grantee of the 
security to the grantor at the time or at any time after 
the execution thereof. 
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filing of a creditor's petition. 
Only in the case of one lender, the State Advances Corporation, 
is this question of priorities clearly answered. Under s. 73 of the 
Rural Intermediate Credit Act 1927 any instrument by way of security 
given for the purposes of that Act shall have priority over any 
previously registered instrument if the grantee under the previously 
registered instrument joins in the instrument given for the purposes 
of that Act and therein agrees that such instrument shall have 
priority. The writer submits that the very existance of s.73 
raises a strong suggestion that in the absence of a special provision 
relating to categories of lenders other than the State Advances, 
the only way in which legal (105) priority can be achieved under 
s. 22 of the Chattels Trans fer Act with absolute certainty is by 
ensuring that there are no prior registered instruments at the 
date of the registration of the instrument for which priority is 
sought. 
It is submitted that this whole problem of priorities with 
its inconvenience and uncertainty could be easily rectified by 
enacting a provision in the Chattels Transfer Act along the lines 
of s.103 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 which provides for the 
variation of priority of mortgages. This section provides, inter 
alia: 
(105) As between the grantees a deed varying priority would confer 
perfectly valid equitable rights. 
,Yictoria L'"i 1•ers.1ty of 
Wellington 
Law Library 
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(1) .•. the priority between themselves of the mortgages 
affecting any land may from time to time be varied 
by a memorandum of priority in Form Jin the Second 
Schedule to this Act and registered under this Act. 
(2)The memorandum of priority shall be executed by the 
mortgagor and also by the mortgagee under every 
mortgage that, by the memorandum, is postponed to 
any mortgage over which it previously had priority. 
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PARI' II: PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF FARM LENDING ON SECURITY OF LIVESTOCK 
In the previous section of this paper the faults in the 
present New Zealand legislation governing livestock securities 
have been discussed. One might well ask how these rules have 
withstood the test of over forty years without being the subject of 
either extensive litigation or reform. The present section of this 
paper seeks to answer this question by dealing with the practical 
circumstances and practice surrounding this type of borrowing. 
The vast majority of lending on the security of livestock 
is done by institutional lenders. The principal sources of such 
finance in the private sector are Trading Banks, Dairy Companies, 
and Stock and Station Companies. The main Government sources are 
the State Advances Corporation and Marginal Lands Board. 
During 1970-71 the State Advances Corporation authorised $3.7 
million for stock loans out of a total annual authorisation for 
farming finance of $55.3 (106). The Corporation policy has been 
to assi t sharemi lkers and lessees of farms to adequately stock 
properties and loans are made available usually for five years on 
stock and plant, interest being at the rate of 5 1/2%. The margin 
of security required is u~ually 60 % of value and the normal limit 
is $8,000 for one man. Applicants between the age of 21 and 35 
may obtain loans at 5 1/2% on an extended limit of 75% of value 
(10 6) Report of State Advances Corporation 1970-71. The balance 
of this amount was on the security of land. 
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available (10 7). It should be noted that these funds are primarily 
intended to encourage development and an estahlished farrrer would 
probably have to look to a bank or stock and station firm for 
this type of finance. 
The Marginal Lands Board was set up under the Marginal Lands 
Act 1950 to assist those farrrers who were unable to obtain capital 
or credit from the normal comrrercial sources to develop their 
farms to an economic level. Applicants to the Board must first 
have tried other avenues of finance such as the State Advances 
Corporation, stock firms, banks and insurance companies. The local 
Marginal Lands Committee must be satisfied that the farmer 
concerned has the experience and business ability to successfully 
carry out his development programrre. Before approval for a loan 
is given a departmental field officer inspects the farm, discusses 
the developrrent with the applicant, and makes a detailed report 
and valuation of the property which is submitted with the application 
to the Marginal Lands Committee which in turn inspects the property 
and discusses the development with the applicant. The Committee's 
report and recommendations are foI:Warded to the Board. If the 
Board approves the proposals as sound it also fixes the amount of 
the advance and the purposes for which it is to be used. Advances 
for stock are at 5 1/2% to 6% and payable within seven years from 
the .date. of the fi.rst advance (10 8) • In 1969-70 $2. 30 million was 
(10 7) 
(10 8) 
These figures are taken from Farm Finance by D.M. Ross, Farm 
Economics Section, New Zealand Department of Agriculture, 
printed in Appendix I of Lending to Farmers p. 55, here 
referred to as Farm Finance. 
Ross, Farm Finance, p.63. 
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advanced by the Board bringing its total of outstanding advances 
up to $15.21 million (109). 
It is therefore evident that the thorough investigation 
preceding the making of a loan by the Board protects any advances 
made. Assistance is not given to the inefficient but solely to 
those farmers whose only barrier to increased production is lack 
of capital. Despite this care there are sometimes failures. Where 
these are the result of circumstances beyond the farmer's control 
the board may sometimes postpone payment or in extreme cases even 
remit money due to it. 
Although Trading Banks lend primarily on the security of land 
they also take charges over stock and a conservative 50% is the 
margin of security normally required. The overdraft interest rate 
has a maximum average of 6%, with current account advances varying 
from 6-7 1/2% and term loans generally 7% and up,vards. Advances 
on current account, being essentially a form of short-term lending, 
are repayable on demand. Provided ha.vever, that the farmer makes 
regular reductions of the advance as seasonal or other farm revenue 
becomes available it is unusual for a bank to "call up" a current 
account. Term loans on the other hand are normally approved on the 
basis of repayment in regular monthly, quarterly or other periodic 
instalments (110). In June 1971 $27.1 million and $35.1 .million was 
adv.an.ced to the dairy and sheep-farming sectors respectively out 
(109) 
(110) 
Report of Department of Lands and Survey 1970. 
Ross, Farm Finance Ch. 6. 
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of a total Trading Bank loan to farmers of $9 3. 0 million at that 
date (111) . 
The stock and station firms are the major lenders on the 
security of livestock and provide short-term and seasonal finance 
for sheep, cattle and mixed farming. The credit granted is "on 
demand" and repayment is expected over short or intermediate term. 
Security is not always taken especially in the case of long 
established and substantial clients. When however security is 
required the stock firms generally prefer to lend on 50% of the 
value of the established security. The rate of interest on current 
account varies from 7 1/2% to 8 1/2%. If no arrangement has been 
made or the account is overdue the rate is 9% (112). 
When a farmer approaches his local stock firm seeking financial 
assistance an inspection of his property and full appraisal of his 
current financial commi trrent is usually made. The branch office 
manager will often know both the farmer and his practical 
circumstances through previous business dealings. When the proposal 
goes to head office for approval it will be considered by men who 
have in many cases themselves been branch managers and are well-
versed in most aspects of farming in New Zealand. The prime 
consideration is the borrower's ability to maintain his farm and 
livestock at a reasonable level of efficiency after having provided 
the. arranged debt reduction and debt servicing charges. It is 
(111) 
(112) 
Reserve Bank Bulletin Series, 1971. 
Ross, Farm Finance, p.95. 
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generally accepted th.at over the last decade the stock and station 
industry has developed its management skills to a high degree and 
therefore the likelihood of a farirer being given a loan which he 
cannot manage has been correspondingly diminished. 
The dairy companies lend to shareholding suppliers, sometiires 
on the security of the stock and chattels of the suppliers and 
sometimes fully against the coming cheques of the particular 
suppliers. In the latter type of lending a proportion of the 
gross proceeds are held back for a final end of season payment, thus 
giving the company a substantial security should a borrower fail 
to meet his loan commitments. The lending policy varies from 
one company to another ranging from 50 to 66 2/3% of the market 
value to a margin whi eh is entirely flexible and discretionary. 
The term can vary from 3 - 6 months to 7 to 9 years, and interest 
can be from 3 to 6 to 7 1/2%. The usual security required is a 
bill of sale over the livestock though in the case of soire of the 
shorter loans no security is required (113). In all cases the 
borrower will approach the dairy company which through the course of 
dealings or subsequent inspection and appraisal can form a reliable 
assessment of the applicant's ability to service the loan. 
The other main sources of rural lending such as building 
societies, trustee savings banks, life assurance offices are not 
relevant to the present discussion since these institutions usually 
lend on the securi.ty of land and not livestock. L.ikewise solicitors 
(113) Ross, Farm Finance pp. 92-94. 
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and private lenders need not concern us as these people do a 
negligible amount of lending on livestock. 
The care and conservation with which the limited number of 
institutional lenders evaluate the ability of their borrowers is not 
of course the only explanation for the relative dearth of dispute 
and litigation in this multi-million dollar field of financing. 
An important reason has been the general prosperity of the farming 
sector and also the importance of farming to the nation as a whole. 
No government could allow a situation to develop whereby large 
numbers of farrrers were forced to sell up their farms and stock 
through inability to pay off their loans. An excellent example 
of this political aspect to farm borrowing was seen in the 1967-71 
slump in the industry, brought about mainly by the drop in wool 
prices. The stock firms found themselves involved with an increasing 
number of farmer customers who, due to falling prices and increased 
costs, were unable to pay off t.heir "on demand" seasonal loans. The 
dramatic increasing burden of "hard-core" debt which the stock 
firms were required to carry, is illustrated by the following 
Reserve Bank figures. 
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STOCK AND STATION AGENTS ADVANCES TO CUSTOMERS (114) 
Period Current Account Other Total 
Advances 
$ Cm) $ Cm) $ Cm) 
1965 - March 67.1 38.6 105. 7 
1966 - March 80. 7 48.8 129.5 
196 7 - March 71. 5 52.7 12 4. 2 
196 8 - March 66.0 52.0 118.0 
19 69 - March 71.1 5 4. 0 125.1 
19 70 - March 77.6 61.3 138.9 
19 71 - March 89. 3 59.6 148.9 
June 130 (estimated) 
Since neither the stock firms nor the farming community were 
able to continue to carry the burden this substantial increase i
n 
lending had placed on their respective resources, representation
s 
were made to the Government in 1970 for assistance. As a result
 
a supplementary loan scherre was made available for farrrers to 
ensure that they had sufficient working capital for the year. I
n 
addition the State l'dvances allocated about $15 million of their
 
vote for farrrers to utilise in the reduction of their "hard-core
" 
debt with seasonal financiers. Further assistance was provided 
by the stock retention scheme whereby farrrers were given a payme
nt 
calculated on the number of sheep on hand at 30th June 1971 (115
). 
Two thirds of a $45 million amount (116) was advanced during the
 
(114) Reserve Bank Bulletin Series 1971. 
(115) The first 250 sheep do not qualify ;from 250 to 5 ,OOO sheep
 
$1 per head is paid; from 5,000 to 10,000 sheep 60c. per 
head and over 10,000 sheep 20c. per head. 
(116) $15 million was contributed by the Me at Board and $ 30 
million by the Governrrent. 
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1971-72 season and another third is to be advanced for the 1972-73 
trading season. Although provision has been made for a third stage 
for the 1973-74 season due to the improved farming economic 
situation this is not likely to be necessary. 
We may therefore conclude from the 1967-71 temporary recession 
that the days of large-scale foreclosures and mortgagee's sales, 
at least in the farming industry, are not likely to reoccur since 
the Government will be first constrained to give the necessary 
assistance. The words of Gilmore, with necessary modifications, 
are equally applicable to the New Zealand situation, when he 
accounts for the famine of farm security litigation in the United 
States since the 1920's and 30's: 
"The organisation of farming and the structure of farm 
debt have, of course, completely changed since the 
great depression of the 19 30 's. The federal government 
has become, directly or indirectly, through a maze of 
agencies, the principal supplier of all kinds of farm 
credit. It is a safe political prediction that a 
collapse of real estate values, followed by a nationwide 
wave of foreclosures and evictions, will never again be 
seen: remedies, humanitarian and financial, will be 
applied far short of the point of total collapse which 
ScM the enactment of the emergency farm legislation, 
state and federal, of the 19 30 's. " ( 117) 
The care with which themstitutional lenders screEnloan 
applicants is only one aspect of the control and supervision 
which they are able to exercise on borrowers. Thus whenever 
stock firms make loans to farmers they require in return that the 
farmer puts all his business through that firm. In this way the 
(117) Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, Vol. 2 
p. 85 8. 
-6 3-
lender has a continuous record of the fanner's income from the 
sale of wool, or sheep and cattle. At any stage when the account 
appears to be deteriorating the branch manager of the stock firm 
will take swift action to ascertain the problem and endeavour to 
help the farrrer through strict budgetary control to extricate 
himself from the difficulties. Thus the danger of total financial 
collapse which would necessitate the realisation of a stock security, 
is usually averted long be fore it occurs. 
Considering the millions of dollars advanced on the security 
of livestock in this country it is amazing that so few problems 
arise with the sale or other disposal of encumbered stock by 
borrowers. One of the principal reasons is the type of borrower 
involved. A number of solicitors who have expressed their views 
to the writer on this subject attribute the infrequency of such 
problems to the general honesty and reliability of the farming 
community. (118) . 
Even if a farmer does wish to make an unauthorised sale he 
will run into difficulties. At the local level, where all auctions 
occur, the stock and station companies will normally know a fanner 
and whether his stock is secured. The names of persons giving 
securities over their stock are available in the Mercantile Gazette 
(118) In the words of a Hamilton practitioner: "I would attribute 
the absence of litigation in this field to the general 
credit worthiness of farmers as a group and the fact 
that they are tied to their farms and their need to 
retain a good credit standing." 
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and most branches keep a list of granters and grantees in their 
area. Should auctioneers inadvertently sell encumbered stock the 
invariable practice is to account to the grantee the commission 
for the sale if such a demand is made. It is also clearly under-
stood that the auctioneer will have to pay the proceeds of the sale 
of stock comprised in a duly registered instrument to the grantee 
should the granter be unable to do so. (119) 
The description requirements of the present Act are the cause 
of considerable criticism among some practitioners (120). It has 
(119) A Gisborne practitioner has stated to the writer that: 
"very few problems arise in Gisborne as the result of the 
sale of encumbered stock because the district is sufficiently 
small for each stock firm to know who is secured to whom 
and to know that unless they toe the line the local stock 
and station agents' Association will be taking them to task. 
The number of private sales in this district is limited and 
in practice have not given rise to any problems." 
A Dunedin solicitor describes his experience with the sale 
of encumbered stock to a freezing company thus: 
"The particular problem on sale of encumbered stock which 
my firm has encountered on several occasions recently 
has been the sale of stock to freezing companies. However, 
the legal position is clear and with a certain amount of 
"prodding" the companies have paid over the net proceeds 
to the moneylender." 
(120) See P . . 24 of this paper. The practical difficulties 
involved are clearly expressed by a Hamilton solicitor as 
follows: -
" The need to obtain an accurate description of livestock in 
terms of the Chattels Trans fer Act is a source of particular 
difficulty, and in view of the substantial turn-over in 
stock, seems a rather useless exercise. One does one's best 
to endeavour to comply strictly with the Act but this can and 
does in some cases lead even to a measure of antagonism from 
the farmer, who sometimes has even to muster stock if the 
property is a large holding. 
Many farmers are uncertain as to the breed of sorre of their 
animals, particularly cross-breds. 
Even if a fully comprehensive and accurate description is 
obtained, the position can alter between the time of 
completion of the description and execution of the Instrument." 
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been suggested that the only reason why they survived in their 
present form is the fact that they have been so seldom tested 
by litigation. 
Between the parties, of course, an insufficient description 
does not void the instrument but only deprives it of the benefits 
of registration. Since, therefore, grantees usually take action 
long before bankruptcy occurs, an equitable charge is usually 
a sufficient security. 
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PARI' III: UNITED STATES LAW OF LIVESTOCK SECURITIES 
(a) The Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9 
For the purposes of comparison it is now proposed to deal 
briefly with the law relating to chattel securities over livestock 
in the United States. The principal legislation in this field is 
Article 9 of the Uniform Conurercial Code. Article 9 was intended 
to provide a simple and unified set of rules within which the 
immense variety and number of present day secured financing 
transactions could proceed with less cost and greater certainty. (121) 
(b) Farm products - Section 9 - 109 
Section 109 classifies "goods " into " consumer goods", "equipment 11 , 
11 farm products" and "inventory". Goods are "farm p roducts " : 
"if they are crops or livestock or supplies used or produced 
in farming operations or if they are products of crops or 
li vestocl< in their unmanufactured states (such as ginned 
cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk . and eggs), and if 
they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in raising, 
fattening, grazing or other farming operations. If goods 
are farm products they are neither equipment nor inventory." 
This classification is important in many situations in 
determining such matters as the rights of persons who buy from a 
debtor goods subject to a security interest (Article 9 - 307) certain 
(121) "The growing complexity of financing transactions forces us to 
keep piling new statutory provisions on top of our inadequate 
and already sufficiently complicated nineteenth-century 
structure of security law. The results of this continuing 
development are, and will be, increasing costs to both parties 
and increasing uncertainty as to their rights and the rights 
of third parties dealing with them." 
Uniform Laws Annotated, Uniform Commercial Code, Vol. 3 
West Publishing Co. (1968) St. Paul, Minn. p.10. here 
referred to as 3 U.L.A. u.c.c. 
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questions of priority (Article 9-312) the place of filing (Article 
9-401) and in wo:rkting out rights after default. The Official 
Comment to the Code states that goods are "farm products" only 
if they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in farming 
operations (122) .and have not been subjected to a manufacturing 
process. The term livestock is not defined but "it is obvious from 
the text that "farming operations 11 includes raising livestock ... " 
(123). When livestock or their products come into the possession 
of a person who is not engaged in farming operations they cease 
to be "farm products 11 • 
( c) Description of Livestock 
The sufficiency of description of goods subject to a security 
is dealt with in section 9-110 which states: 
"for the purposes of this Article any description of 
personal property or real estate is sufficient, whether 
or not it is specific,if it reasonably identifies what 
is described." 
The Official Cornrrent states that a description under this section 
is sufficient if it cbes the job assigned to it, narrely that it 
makes possible the identification of the chattel described. The 
section is intended to depart from the decisions often found in the 
older chattel mortgage cases, in which descriptions were held to be 
insufficient unless they were of the most exact and detailed nature. 
(122) 
(12 3) 
c.f. the New Zealand position as expressed by Edwards J. in 
In re Alloway (supra) that the occupation of the avner of 
livestock is irrelevant and see pp. 5-6 (supra). 
3 U.L.A. U.C.C. p. 74. 
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At first sight section 9-110 deals with the problem of 
describing livestock in an eminently short and simple fashion. 
However, the discussion earlier in this paper (124) on the special 
difficulties in describing this type of security show that at 
least in the case of livestock Article 9-110 poses more questions 
than it answers. It is therefore necessary to turn to the case 
law on this question (125). 
The summary of the common law description requirement of 
animals in the Corpus Juris Secundum (126) states that although 
the Courts recognise certain general principles determining the 
sufficiency of the description requirement of animals in a 
chattel mortgage, they are not uniform in the application of such 
principles when ihe rights of third parties become involved. 
Generally speaking a description is sufficient if it puts third 
parties on inquiry which, if pursued, would enable them to identify 
the mortgaged property. Thus in County Bank v. Hulen (127) a 
description of rules by reference to the location, possession, value 
and seller's name was held to be sufficient. However a number of 
cases have held that animals are sufficiently described by merely 
stating their characteristics with respect to age, colour, height, 
(12 4) 
(12 5) 
See pp.10-24 (supra) . 
See Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 14, Chattel Mortgages 
Section 65 pp.673-5 for the complete list of the American 
decisions. 
(126) ibid pp.673-5. 
(127) Mo. App. 195 S.W. 74. 
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sex and weight, or by indicating their marks and brands (128). 
Other cases have held such a description to be void as against third 
parties unless there is some additional means of identification such 
as a statement as to location, ownership, or possession, or some 
additional means of identification (129). The designation of 
animals merely by species or class and the number mortgaged has 
generally been held to be insufficient (130) without a reference 
to the location of the animals. Thus in Payne v. Boutwell (131) 
"16 head of dairy milch cows of various kinds, colours and 
descriptions now located on my dairy farm in West Elba" was found 
by the Court to be a sufficient description. 
Provided that the description of mortgaged animals was 
originally sufficient, the mortgagee does not lose his right to 
enforce his recuri ty because of a subsequent change in the animal's 
appearance (132). If the description is othe.:rwise sufficient, errors 
such as in stating the age, colour, weight, or brand or the number 
included under a certain brand, wi 11 not vitiate the mortgage unless 
s .uch .errors. are confusing and misleading. In Hourigan v. Home State 
(12 8) 
(129) 
(130) 
( 131) 
( 132) 
Thomason v. Decatur County Bank, 111 s .E. 578. 
A description by colour, although alone insufficient, is 
rendered sufficient by a further description of the animals 
as being purchased from the mortgagee whose residence is stated 
in the mortgage. Burlington State Bank v. Marlin Nat. Bank. 
Ci v . A pp . , 2 0 7 S • W • 9 5 4 • 
However in Sheffield v. Dean, 135 S.E. 109 "30 head of horses 
now located at the residence of ... (the mortgagor)" in a named 
district of a certain county was held too vague and indefinite. 
164 So. 753, 754. 
Stickney v. Dunaway, 53 So. 770. 
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Bank, 162 p.699, 700 cattle were described in a mortgage by 
classification, age, colour and a certain brand followed by 
staterrents that the described cattle comprised all cattle owned 
by the mortgagor and that the mortgage covered all the mortgagor's 
cattle "in the above brand or description or in any brand of the above 
classification". The Court held that the description was sufficient 
in that it cast upon a third party the duty of inquiring as to 
whether cattle of a brand different from that stated in the mortrgage 
were covered thereby. However in Ehrke v. Tucker (133) a description 
of "native Kansas steers" by age, brand and location was considered 
by the Court to be insufficient to give notice that it embraced 
cattle not bearing the designated brand and found in a location 
other than that specified in the mortgage. 
In the writer's opinion there is considerable rrerit in the 
more liberal American approach to the question of livestock 
description than has been shown by the Courts in New Zealand. Surely 
the most important purpose of the registered security agreerrent is 
to put parties who intend to give credit to a farrrer on inquiry 
since few potential lenders would bother to catch all the animals 
concerned to ensure that all their brands earmarks or other means 
of identification corresponded with the registered agreement. 
Perhaps the greatest admission of the unsui tabi li ty of the New 
Zealand stock description requirements has been the need to invoke 
the. fictional concept of the covenant to brand to obviate the results 
(133) 160 p.985. 
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which a strict interpretation of ss.28 and 29 would otherwise 
give (134) . 
(d) After-acquired stock 
Under Section 9-204(1) a security interest cannot attach until 
there is agreeIIEnt that it attaches, value is given and the debtor 
has rights in the secured chattel (135). Under subsection (3) a 
security agreement may provide that collateral, whenever acquired, 
shall secure all obligations covered by the security agreerrent ( 136). 
This is a direct negation of the principles embodied in the New 
Zealand Act which require every instrument to have an inventory of 
the chattels comprised therein and render instrurrents void as 
against the persons mentioned in sections 18 and 19 in respect of 
any chattels which the granter acquires or becomes entitled to 
after the tiIIE of the execution of the instrument. However, it wi 11 
be recalled that the New Zealand provisions dealing with livestock 
securities (137) are not subject to sections 23 and 24 and therefore 
share the saIIE underlying principle as section 9-204(3) of the Code, 
( 134) 
(135) 
( 136) 
( 137) 
See pp. 10-24 of this paper. A Masterton solicitor who wrote 
to the writer on this subject recomrrended an approach rather 
similar to that used by the U.S. Courts: "I see no 
reason why all livestock on a given property should not 
prima facie be deemed to be the property of the land 
occupier subject to any livestock being excluded from a 
security on satisfactory proof of a Bailiff or an Official 
Assignee that in fact the stock be long to sorre other person. 
For the purposes of Article 9-204(1) the debtor has no rights 
in the young of livestock until they are conceived. 
Al though certain special rules in the case of crops and 
consurrer goods are stated in subsection (4) of this Article. 
SS. 2 8 and 29 . 
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namely that they allow a security interest to attach to after-
acqui red property. 
Unlike s.29 of the Chattels Transfer Act, Article 9 does not 
imply a term by which the natural increase of stock comprised in 
a stock mortgage or stock of the same class are subsequently 
brought onto the land are also deemed to be included in the mortgage. 
Again we must turn to the American case law for an answer to this 
question. In determining whether a mortgage covers after-acquired 
property, the Court will, as nearly as possible, carry out the 
intention of the parties (138). The description will not,however,be 
extended beyond its terms and where the property to be acquired in 
the future is expressly limited to a certain class the mortgage 
will not be extended to another class. If, however, there is 
a covenant that after-acquired property of a certain class will 
be subject to the mortgage then such property will be included 
even if it is of a totally different quality to the property 
which is presently mortgaged ( 139). It would therefore appear that 
the covenant to brand after-acquired stock implied under the New 
Zealand Act (140) would be fully effective under Arrerican law. 
The position in the United States as to the inclusion of the 
natural increase of stock in a mortgage is of course affected by 
( 13 8) Stockiards Loan Co. v. Nicholas 243 F. 511. 
(139) Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, v. New York & Q .c. Ry. Co. 
170 N.E. 887. 
(140) See pp. 25-35 of this paper. 
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the laws of the various states. In sorre jurisdictions the mortgagee 
is vested with the legal title to the mortgaged property while in 
others the mortgage is considered a mere lien. In the forrrer case 
it is generally held that the mortgage extends to the increase of 
the animals during the life of the mortgage, even though the 
mortgage is silent as iD the increase (141) . Generally, in these 
jurisdictions where the mortgage creates a rrere lien without passing 
title, particularly where a statute so provides, the lien does not 
cover the increase of the animals mortgaged unless these are expressly 
included in the mortgage agreement. Thus in Brown v. Schwab (142) 
the Arizona Supreme Court had to consider a mortgage of "all 
cattle and horses branded OX0,/0," running on a particular range, 
which was followed by statement, "The mortgagor agrees not to sell 
any more cattle than the amount of increase each year". McAlister, 
Ch. J. (143) held that on its proper construction the mortgage 
covered the increase of such cattle, and contemplated that such 
increase would be branded in like manner (144). 
(141) O'Brien v. First Galesbury Nat. Bank & Trust Co. 194 
N.E. 562. 
(142) 39 A.L.R. 150 (Arizona Supreme Court 1925). 
(143) Ross & Lockwood, J.J. concurring. 
(144) per McAlister Ch. J. at p.153 "It is appellant's contention 
that the term "branded" refers to the cattle bearing this 
brand at the time the mortgage was executed, and none other; 
but a consideration of the entire instrument, we think, leads 
to the conclusion that it refers not merely to these, but as 
well to their increase, which it was clearly intended should 
thereafter bear the same brand." 
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A lien on the natural increase of stock. does not continue 
after a reasonable period of nurture by the mother has elapsed as 
against a subsequent mortgagee or a purchaser without actual or 
constructive knowledge of the mortgage (145). This is ,of course , 
quite different from the position under s.29 of the New Zealand 
Act where no such limitation is placed on the duration of the 
security. Nevertheless as between the parties the lien may continue 
and in Holt v. Lucas (146) it was held that the fact that a chattel 
mortgage specifically covers the increase of livestock will cause 
the lien to continue during the existence of the mortgage. 
(e) Sale of ·encumbered stock 
Section 9-201 of the Code dealing with the general validity 
of a security agreement states: 
"Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement 
is effective according to its terms between the parties, 
against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors. 
The official comment to Section 9-201 emphasises that a 
security agreement is effective against third parties. " 
It is interesting to note that under the Code the mortgagee 
of farm products (which includes livestock) is singled out for 
especially favourable treatment: (147) 
(145) Paska v. Saunders, 153, A.451. 
( 14 6) 9 6 P . 30 . 
(147) Gilmore. Security Interests in Personal Property. Vol. II 
p.707 questions why if the buyer in the ordinary course of 
business takes free of a perfected security interest in the 
case of inventory, he should not take free of such interest in 
the farm products case. "Yet, rightly or wrongly, and for 
reasons which are never precisely articulated, the 
agricultural financer comes off much better than the 
inventory financer." 
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"A buyer in the ordinary course of business... (148) 
other than a person buying farm products from a person 
engaged in farming operations takes free of a security 
interest treated by his seller even though the security 
interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows 
of its existence." (149) 
Under Section 9-306(2), except where Article 9 otherwise provides, a 
security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding a 
disposition thereof by the debtor, unless his action was authorised 
by the secured party. Since no section of the Article "otherwise 
provides" in the case of farm products, Section 9-306(2) gives 
the secured party the right to follow collateral into the hands 
of persons who have bought and paid for livestock over which, 
unbeknown to them, another party has a security interest. 
Fortunately for buyers finding themselves in this predicanent 
the common law rules of waiver and estoppel may be invoked against 
the secured party, and it may be argued that the debtor's authority 
to sell the collateral arises from an express provision in the 
security agreement or from the conduct and action of the secured 
party. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of New Mexico in 
Clovis National Bank v. Harold Thomas d/b/a/ Clovis Cattle Commission 
Company (150) shows that the above defences may be pc:Merful weapons 
in the. hands of buyers or auctioneers of encumbered livestock. 
(148) "The buyer in the ordinary course of business "is &fined 
as one who buys in good faith and without knowledge that 
the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights 
or security interest of a third party" 3 U.L.A. U.C.C. p.185. 
(149) Article 9-307(1). 
( 15 0 ) 7 7 N . M. 5 5 4 , 4 2 5 P . 2 d. 7 2 6 ( 19 6 7) . 
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In the Clovis National Bank case the bank loaned money to a 
rancher who in turn gave the bank a promissory date and a security 
interest in his cattle. The security was properly filed in 
accordance with Section 9-401 of the Code. The security agreement 
prohibited the rancher to sell or transfer the cattle without the 
permission of the bank. The rancher consigned these cattle to 
the defendant for sale at public auction, although the bank had no 
knowledge of the consignrrent and had not consented to the sales. 
The auctioneer sold the cattle and remitted the proceeds to the 
rancher, but the rancher failed to repay the bank loan which the 
cattle had secured. It was established in evidence that the rancher 
had previously sold cattle covered by a similar security agreerrent 
without obtaining the bank's permission to do so. On that occasion 
he had paid the bank the proceeds of the sale under circumstances 
such that the bank knew an unpermitted sale of the collateral had 
been made, but the bank had raised no objection. 
The trial Court held that the bank had consented to and 
acquiesced in the sales, and was estopped from recovery because of 
its conduct. On appeal the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the 
bank by prior conduct had waived its right to require its 
authorisation for the sale of the cattle. The Court, basing its 
decision not on estoppel but on consent and waiver, stated that 
although the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code applied 
to this case, the pre-code law result still prevailed. 
Oman, J. delivering the majority judgment of the Court of 
Appeals considered that: 
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"By excluding "farm products" from the classifications of 
"equipment" and "inventory" and by expressly providing in 
Section 9-307 (1) ... , that a buyer in the ordinary course 
of business of farm products from a person engaged in 
farming operations does not take free of a security 
interest created by the seller, the drafts:rren of the code 
apparently intended "to freeze the agricultural mortgagee 
into the special status he has achieved under the pre-code 
case law." 
2 Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, 714 
(1965) (151) 
Oman J. was therefore of the opinion that the holder of the 
security interest in farm products has the same protection under 
the code which he had under pre-code law, and that the cattle 
broker was still liable to the secured party for the conversation of 
the collateral. Nevertheless under the Code the secured party may 
consent to the sale of the collateral, and thereby waive his rights 
therein ( 152) and since there was no particular p rovision in the 
Code displacing the law of waiver ,particularly waiver by implied 
acquiescence or consent, the Code provisions were supple:rrented 
by these common law rules (153). 
A vigorous dissent to the majority opinion was recorded by 
Carmody J. .(154) who .considered that Section 1-205 of the Code 
( 151) 
( 15 2) 
( 15 3) 
(15 4) 
425 P. 2d. 731. 
Official Conunent No. 3 Section 9-306 and Official Corrurent 
No. 2 Section 9-307. 
425 P. 2d. 731-732. 
"The consequences and repercussions that today's decision 
will have on security interests involving farm products 
and the applicability of the corru:nercial Code t? su~h ar~ 
incalculable. Thus even though it may sound like a voice 
crying in the wilderness" I feel required to respectfully 
voice my dissent." ibid. p.734. 
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was of particular importance to the facts of the present case: 
The express terms of an agreement and an applicable 
course of dealing or usage of trade shall be construed 
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other, but 
when such construction is unreasonable express terms 
control both course of dealing and usage of trade. (155) 
The Judge was of the opinion that there was never an express written 
waiver nor sufficient evidence on which a common practice, usage 
or procedure could be based. Moreover the defendant auctioneer had 
no more right than the debtor himself to rely on a custom and usage 
which was contrary to the express terms of the contract. 
This decision has been criticised by Thomas H. Emmerson (156) 
"One purpose of the Code is to permit the continued 
expansion of commercial practices. The decision in the 
Thomas case is likely to restrict loans on livestock. 
The usefulness of providing livestock as collateral is 
now under question." 
Emmerson suggests that an auctioneer or a person buying livestock 
directly from the owner should be charged with the duty to search 
the records for the presence of a security agreement covering 
the livestock (157). This is in effect the position in New Zealand 
under s.4 of the Chattels Transfer Act 1924, which provides, 
inter alia, that all persons shall be deemed to have notice of a 
registered instrument and of the contents thereof. The discussion 
earlier in this paper on The King v. Buckland shows that even where 
an instrument over livestock has not conformed with the description 
(155) 
(156) 
( 15 7) 
ibid, p. 736. 
Uniform Commercial Code - Security Interests in Livestock 
(1968) 8 National Resources Journal 183. 
ibid. 189. 
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requirements of section 28 the auctioneer will nevertheless be 
liable to the secured party. It was also sho;,m that under the 
1924 Act the protection afforded to auctioneers or purchasers 
under s.19 does not extend to the case of an instrument which 
fails to comply with s.28 (158). 
It can of course be argued that the New Zealand position is 
too favourable to mortgagees. However in the final analysis the 
crucial question is whether the laws relating to a particular 
type of collateral offer sufficient protection to the lenders. 
If they do not then the lender will be reluctant to m~(e finance 
available and the borrower himself will probably be the ultimate 
loser because it may be unable to obtain sufficient funds to carry 
on his operations efficiently (159). 
( 15 8) 
(159) 
See pp. 44- 46 infra. 
cf. Hansard (1858) Vol. 2, p.382, debate on the Wool and 
Oil Securities Bill: Mr. Stafford: "This rreasure was 
of a very simple and intelligible character, and one much 
needed in this country, where great inconvenience was 
frequently experienced from the wait of ready cash. 
The difficulty of obtaining ready money frequently 
resulted in injury to stock, and materially retarded 
the producing powers of the country." 
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PART nr,: CONCLUSTON 
The following are the principal aspects of the law relating 
to livestock securities which in the writer's opinion require 
clarification or airendment. 
(a) "Class" 
(b) 
(160) 
The reference to "all stock of the class or classes " 
in s.29 should be expanded so that it is clear whether the 
word "class" refers to animals of a particular genus or 
species or to a category or typ e of animals within a genus 
or species. The writer suggests the latter definition is 
not only preferable but also appears to be currently 
accepted as tile correct meaning to be given to the word 
"class". 
Description of Stock 
In the writer's view most efforts to describe a large 
number of animals with precision are impracticable. 
Consequently the exactitude required in the Act by 
reference to brand, mark, earmark or naire, sex, age or 
colour should be deleted. This would then leave s.28 
requiring that stock should be described so "as to be 
reasonably capable of identification". In addition, unless 
the contrary be expressed in the instrurrent, all animals 
(present and after-acquired) of a given class (i.e. species) 
depasturing on the lands of the granter, such lands being 
referred to in the instrument, should prima facie be deerred 
to belong to the granter in the absence of sufficient proof 
to the contrary. It could be argued that such an arrendment 
is too favourable to the grantee since it includes all the 
animals of a class irrespective of whether these have been 
expressly referred to in the original instrument. The 
answer to this criticism is that the above proposal is in 
effect the present position by virtue of the Court's 
interpretation of the "covenant to brand" in s.29 (160). 
This proposal has the great advantage that it recognises 
the special problem involved in livestock description and 
obviates the "covenant to brand" fiction. Secondly if the 
grantor is unhappy that all of his stock of a class should 
be included in the security he can stipulate to the contrary 
in the instrument, provided the grantee will consent. 
Refer to pp. 31-35 supra. 
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(c) After-acquired stock and the covenant to brand 
The proposals suggested in (b) above obviate the present 
problems discussed under the heading "After-acquired stock" 
earlier in the paper (161). 
(d) Description of land 
This is referred to in recommendation (b) above. It is 
submitted that the land should be the cornerstone of the 
description of stock because it is the easiest and most 
practical method of identifying the ownership of stock. 
Nevertheless it is recommended that if stock are described 
so as to be otherwise reasonably capable of identification 
then the fact that the land on which such stock are 
depasturing is rot sufficiently described should not void 
the instrument. Nevertheless it is obvious that a failure 
to describe the land on which stock are depasturing will 
render the task of sufficiently describing the stock 
correspondingly more difficult. 
(e) Purchasers and auctioneers of encumbered stock 
( f) 
Section 28 should be amended by inserting the words 
"and Section nineteen" after the words "Section eighteen" 
where the latter words appear in that section. 
Description of sheep in wool securities : s.38 
Section 38 should require that sheep over which a wool 
security exists, be described or referred to so as to 
be reasonably capable of identification, in accordance with 
the proposal in Q:)) above. 
(g) Grantee's rights as against prior and subsequent encurnbrancees 
of· sheep subject to wool security 
Section 39 should be expanded to deal with the rights of 
grantees of wool securities as against prior encumbrance.es. It 
is recommended that the grantee's rights over the sheep should 
be equivalent to those of the granter until the prior 
encurnbrancee takes steps to enforce his interests. 
(h) Variation of priority of instruments 
(161) 
A provision should be added to the Act ernbo?ying a system 
for the variation of the priority of registered instrumen~s 
similar to that in s.103 of the Land Transfer Act 1952 which 
deals with the variation of priority of land mortgages. 
ibid. 
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Despite the dearth of reported decisions in recent years on 
the livestock security provisions of the Chattels Transfer Act it 
would be wrong to assu:rre that this is a reflection on the quality 
or suitability of the legislation. The writer has found among most 
of the experienced practitioners who have expressed their views to him, 
a general dissatisfaction with many features of the present system. 
Unfortunately in a comparatively non-controversial area such as 
livestock securities there is a danger that unsatisfactory provisions 
may be indefinitely retained or largely reproduced in new legislation. 
It is with the desire to avoid this danger that the writer has 
suggested that the foregoing a:rrend:rrents or clarifications should 
be made to the present Act or borne in mind should there be a 
general reform of the present law relating to chattel securities. 
* * * * 
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